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Imitation mechanisms in artificial and biological agents are of great interest mainly
for two reasons: from the engineering point of view, they allow the agent to efficiently
utilise the knowledge of other agents in its social environment in order to quickly learn
how to perform new tasks; from the scientific point of view, these mechanisms are in¬
triguing since they require the integration of information from the visual, memory, and
motor systems. This thesis presents a dual-route architecture for movement imitation
and considers its plausibility as a computational model of primate movement imitation
mechanisms.
The developed architecture consists of two routes, termed passive and active. The
active route tightly couples behaviour perception and generation: in order to perceive
a demonstrated behaviour, the motor behaviours already in the imitator's repertoire
are utilised. While the demonstration is unfolding, these behaviours are executed on
internal forward models, and predictions are generated with respect to what the next
state of the demonstrator will be. Behaviours are reinforced based on the accuracy of
these predictions. Imitation amounts to selecting the behaviour that performed best,
and re-enacting that behaviour. If none of the existing behaviours performs adequately,
control is passed to the passive route, which extracts the representative postures that
describe the demonstrated behaviour, and imitates it by sequentially going through the
extracted postures. Demonstrated behaviours imitated through the passive route form
the basis for acquiring new behaviours, which are added to the repertoire available
to the active route. A stereo vision robotic head, and a dynamically simulated 13
DoF articulated robot are utilised in order to implement this architecture, illustrate
its behavioural characteristics, and investigate its capabilities and limitations. The
experiments show the architecture being capable of imitating and learning a variety
of head and arm movements, while they highlight its inability to perceive a behaviour
that is in the imitator's repertoire, if the behaviour is demonstrated with execution
parameters (for example, speed) unattainable by the imitator.
This thesis also proposes this architecture as a computational model of primate move¬
ment imitation mechanisms. The behavioural characteristics of the architecture are
compared with biological data available on monkey and human imitation mechanisms.
The behaviour of the active route correlates favourably with brain activation data,
both at the neuronal level (monkey's F5 'mirror neurons'), and at the systems level
(human PET and MEP data that demonstrate activation of motor areas during ac¬
tion observation and imagination). The limitations of the architecture that surfaced
during the computational experiments lead to testable predictions regarding the beha¬
viour of mirror neurons. The passive route is a computational implementation of an
intermodal-matching mechanism, that has been hypothesised to underlie early infant
movement imitation (the AIM hypothesis). Destroying the passive route leads to the
architecture being unable to imitate any novel behaviours, but retaining its ability to
imitate known ones. This characteristic correlates favourably with the symptoms dis¬
played by humans suffering from visuo-imitative apraxia. Finally, dealing with novel
vs. known behaviours through separate routes correlates favourably with human brain
activation (PET) data which show that the pattern of activation differs according to
whether the observed action is meaningful or not to the observer.
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We do not exist alone. Humans and most other animal species live in societies where the
behaviour of an individual influences and is influenced by other members of the society.
Within societies, an individual learns not only on its own, through classical conditioning
and reinforcement, but to a large extent through its conspecifics, by observation and
imitation. Species from rats to birds to humans have been observed to turn to their
conspecifics for efficient learning of useful knowledge. One of the most important
mechanisms for the transmission of this knowledge is imitation.
At the heart of the ability to imitate lies a mechanism which matches perceived external
behaviours with equivalent internal behaviours of its own, recruiting information from
the perceptual, motor and memory systems. This mechanism has been shown to be
present even in newborn infants, which have been observed to imitate the facial gestures
of their caretakers. In humans, malfunctions of this mechanism, surfaced as an inability
to imitate, have been used as detectors of pathological disorders including autism and
some forms of apraxia. This thesis presents a computational model of this mechanism.
1.1 What is the problem this thesis will address?
This thesis describes theoretical and experimental work performed on the design and
implementation of an imitation architecture that allows an imitator agent to match
visually perceived movements with equivalent movement of its own. To reduce the
number of potential solutions, the following constraints were imposed during the design
1
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process:
• The architecture should be general enough to incorporate evidence from psycho¬
logy, pathology, and neurophysiology on the mechanisms underlying biological
imitation, so it can serve as a model of these mechanisms.
• It should be detailed enough to allow implementation on robotic platforms in
order to:
— equip robots with the ability to imitate;
— investigate its advantages and its limitations through experimentation.
1.2 Why is it an interesting problem?
1.2.1 The engineering perspective
Designing an architecture which equips robots with the ability to imitate will allow
the possibility for learning through demonstration. A human demonstrator can show
an example of the task and the robot can learn by imitating the human. This will
give people unfamiliar with robot programming the ability to teach robots to perform
tasks.
1.2.2 The scientific perspective
Research on imitation spans several disciplines including neurophysiology, psychology,
psychophysics and pathology. The available data are often found at completely dif¬
ferent levels of description, from neural recordings to behavioural data from human
neuropathological examinations. Computational modelling has the potential to integ¬
rate data from several disciplines in a common platform. The need for very precise
descriptions so that mechanisms can be implementable on computational and robotic
platforms illuminates gaps in theories, and allows research to focus on filling these
gaps. Even more importantly, computational modelling enables the development of
predictions, which can be an important tool for directing further experiments.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.3 The contributions of this thesis
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The work described in this thesis offers the following contributions:
• It introduces a distinction between passive and active imitation, to distinguish
between approaches where the imitator goes through a "perceive - recognise -
reproduce" cycle (passive imitation) and the motor systems are involved only
during the "reproduce" phase, and the approaches where the imitator's motor
systems are actively involved during the perception process (active imitation).
• It develops a computational architecture inspired by Meltzoff's Active Intermodal
Matching mechanism, hypothesised to underlie early infant imitation. The archi¬
tecture is capable of imitating and acquiring any demonstrated movement that
is within the capabilities of the imitator, but its 'passive' characteristics do not
correlate well with all the biological data available.
• To overcome the disadvantages of the passive architecture above, a novel, dis¬
tributed imitation architecture with 'active' properties is developed. The novelty
of this architecture lies in that the same motor structures that are responsible
for the generation of a movement are recruited in order to perform movement
perception. Imitation becomes an active process: instead of going through a
passive "perceive - recognise - reproduce" cycle, the imitator actively generates
possible behaviours in parallel, executes them on internal forward models and se¬
lects among them based on the quality of the predictions they offer with respect
to the states of the on-going demonstration. However the disadvantage of this
route is that it is not capable of imitating demonstrated movements not already
present in the imitator's repertoire.
• In order to get the best of both worlds, the two architectures above are combined
into the final dual-route architecture: known movements are imitated through
the active route; if the movement is novel, evident from the fact that all internal
behaviours have failed to predict adequately well, control is passed to the passive
route which is able to imitate and acquire the demonstrated movement.
• Algorithmic requirements for such mechanisms are made explicit through the
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implementation of the designed architectures on robotic platforms, which include
a stereo-vision head and a dynamics simulator of a thirteen degrees-of-freedom
robot.
• Computational experiments are performed using as a test set movements that,
starting from a rest position, achieve the various postures of the International
Standard Semaphore Code (appendix A). This set was selected to allow for easy
and compact comparison. The experiments demonstrate the ability of the archi¬
tecture to imitate, as well as acquire, a variety of movements including unknown,
partially known, and fully known sequences of movements. They also reveal
the inability of the architecture to match demonstrated movements with existing
equivalent ones of its own, when they are demonstrated at speeds unattainable
by the imitator.
• Finally, the developed architecture is proposed as a model of primate movement
imitation mechanisms. A comparison is performed between the characteristics of
the architecture and biological data on human and monkey imitation mechanisms.
It is shown that they correlate well, thus offering possible explanations for the
biological data. Perhaps more importantly, the limitations of the architecture, as
revealed by the computational experiments, offer testable predictions regarding
the behaviour of the biological mechanisms.
1.4 Roadmap
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 sets the overall scene by describing related work on imitation in
artificial and biological systems. The utility and the mechanisms of imitation are
probed further, followed by research on imitation in assembly and mobile robots.
The description of animal imitation research is split into two parts: work aimed
at detecting the existence of imitation in various animals is only briefly described
here, since it is of limited use to the purposes of this thesis; neurophysiological
work probing the monkey's imitation mechanisms is described in more detail in
chapter 6, where the developed architecture is proposed as a model. Similarly,
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research on human movement imitation is distributed across chapters 3 (work
with infants) and 6 (work with adults) so that specialised background work is
presented close to the theoretical and computational work that it has provided
the inspiration for, or is relevant to.
• Chapter 3 presents the passive imitation architecture developed, inspired by
Meltzoff's AIM hypothesis derived from psychological experiments with human
infants, which are also described. The architecture is implemented on a stereo-
vision robotic head in the context of deferred imitation of human head move¬
ments.
• Chapter 4 presents the active imitation architecture followed by its implementa¬
tion on a dynamically simulated thirteen DoF robot. Computational experiments
investigating the capabilities and limitations of this architecture are also presen¬
ted, in the context of arm movements.
• Chapter 5 presents the dual-route imitation architecture, which combines the
passive and active architectures that were described in the previous two chapters.
This dual-route imitation architecture is put to the test, confirming its abilities
to learn simple novel movements, as well as sequences where none, some, or all
the parts are known.
• Chapter 6 brings together data from neurophysiological experiments with mon¬
keys, human brain activation data, and human pathological data, and compares
the behavioural characteristics of the architecture with those of the biological
systems. The dual-route architecture is proposed as a computational model of
primate movement imitation mechanisms, and the explanations and testable pre¬
dictions that are offered by the model are described.
• Finally, chapter 7 reiterates the important points of this thesis, and presents
some directions for future research.
• Appendix A presents the letters of the International Standard Semaphore Code
using 'Bouncer', the developed simulated robot. Appendix B lists the publica¬




In this chapter, the various issues involved with imitation in biological and artificial
systems will be examined, and research that has been investigating these issues will be
presented. The chapter is organised as follows: first, the issue of the utility of imitation,
already briefly discussed in the introduction, will be probed further. It will be argued
that imitation is useful as a method of cutting down the search space of problems that
the agent is trying to solve, that it is capable of teaching the imitator novel approaches
to solving a task, and that it has very low requirements on the trainer. Apart from its
technical merits, imitation plays an important role in interpersonal relationships: its
importance as a means for recognising other agents, their intentions or even emotions
will be discussed. Animal research investigating the existence of imitation in biological
systems will be also briefly presented. Then, the issue of the mechanisms underlying
imitation will be probed further: it will be argued that imitation can occur at several
different levels of action description, including "basic", "functional" and "abstract" im¬
itation. An analysis of the subtasks that constitute the imitation process will complete
the discussion of the theoretical issues. The presentation will then move to technical
issues: research on techniques that have been used in order to equip robotic systems
with the ability to imitate human or robot demonstrations will be presented.
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2.2 On the utility of imitation
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Learning by imitation has received a lot of interest in the field of artificial agent design
since it offers many benefits to the development of the capabilities of the agent (Demiris
and Hayes, 1996).
• First of all, it has the potential of cutting down the solution search space for
tasks that the agent is trying to solve (Demiris and Hayes, 1996; Schaal, 1997).
An agent in isolation can in theory, given sufficient time and operational re¬
sources, learn the solution to any task through reinforcement learning (Sutton,
1991), provided that a suitable reinforcement function is also given. However,
the presence of another agent, an 'expert' can be utilised by having that expert
demonstrating the solution to the learner who would then learn more quickly by
imitation. Even if the learner's imitation is imperfect, it will still serve well as a
first approximation for a solution. The search space is essentially reduced to an
area around this approximation.
• On a related note, learning by imitation can provide agents with novel solutions
to tasks that they wouldn't be able to solve by themselves, due for example, to
the lack of an appropriate reinforcement function.
• This method of learning has very low requirements on the teacher: for example,
it does not require any explicit reward/punishment signals to be computed by
the teacher so they can be passed to the learner. The teacher need not interrupt
the task execution process to cater for the learner. Of course, it is possible to
incorporate teaching signals in this scheme, if for example, the learner makes
mistakes during the imitation process, in which case the teacher can intervene to
correct these.
Apart from the aforementioned technical benefits that imitation has for artificial agents,
it plays an important role in biological agents as well. Since it is an efficient mechanism
for the transmission of information, imitation has been seen as an important form of
cultural learning (Tomasello et al., 1993). It has also been suggested that a mechanism
who matches externally perceived actions with equivalent internal actions provided the
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 8
basis for the development of communication skills and language (Arbib and Rizzolatti,
1996; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). In addition to this, its importance in what is termed
"theory of mind" has been the topic of intense research; imitation has been seen as an
important mechanism for:
• recognising who others are (Meltzoff and Moore, 1994);
• recognising their intentions, emotions, and other internal attributes (Wallbott,
1991).
Meltzoff has argued that "imitation is to understanding people as physical manipula¬
tion is to understanding things" (Meltzoff and Moore, 1994, page 96). The argument
was brought forward as a result of a series of experiments which demonstrated that
infants are capable of, and are actively engaged in imitation from a very early stage.
Although these experiments will be described in more detail in the next chapter (where
a computational implementation of the proposed mechanism will also be presented), it
is interesting to note here that Meltzoff was essentially suggesting that imitation serves
the function of probing the identity of people. Experiments (Meltzoff and Moore, 1992)
showed that if an experimenter in the past appeared in front of the infant and per¬
formed certain (facial) gestures, and appears again, the infant will imitate the gestures
that it had previously seen performed by this experimenter, as if it is asking: "is this
person in front of me the one that acts in the way I've seen him doing before, or is it
a person that simply looks the same?" The infants use imitation to recognise people,
following their general strategy of getting to know things in part through acting on
them, so they can bring their perceptual and stored representations into register.
Related work has suggested that even recognition of the experimenter's emotions and
other internal attributes can occur through imitation. Subjects were recorded (without
their knowledge) while they were observing pictures of faces displaying various emo¬
tions. Two weeks later, the subjects were asked to observe the videos of themselves
observing the pictures and judge which emotions they were observing two weeks earlier.
The results showed that the subjects were accurate in their judgement to a degree above
chance (Wallbott, 1991), suggesting that humans recruit imitation as a way of inferring




Given the benefits that imitation has, its not surprising that nature has equipped
many species with the capacity to imitate. Anecdotal reports of the imitation abilities
of various animals started at the end of last century (see Whiten and Ham, 1993, for
a review). More recently, research on imitation in non-human animals has moved in
controlled experimental environments, and has taken place along the following two
dimensions:
• What is imitation, and how can it be distinguished from the several other forms
of social learning?
• Which animals are capable of imitation?
There is wide disagreement in both dimensions above. Imitation has been used as
a label for a variety of social phenomena, including ones which could be explained
by other simpler processes, such as observational conditioning, social facilitation and
instrumental learning, among others (Galef, 1988). Given that the definitions of imita¬
tion differ, there is not wide agreement on a methodology for detecting the existence of
imitation abilities (Galef, 1988; Heyes and Galef, 1996), and the adequacy of some of
the commonly used ones has been brought into question (Gardner, 1997). Experiments
with rats (Heyes et al., 1992), parrots (Moore, 1992), octopuses, dolphins (Tayler and
Saayman, 1972), monkeys (Strayer, 1976; Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 1990) and chim¬
panzees (Custance et ah, 1995; Whiten and Custance, 1996; Whiten et ah, 1996) have
all claimed to have shown the capacity of these animals to learn by observation and
imitation.
Reviews of the various definitions and of the work in ethological and psychological
aspects of social learning include (Whiten and Ham, 1993) and (Galef, 1988). There
have also been attempts to develop frameworks which would encompass all kinds of
imitation from all different species, for example (Davis, 1973; Mitchell, 1987; Moore,
1996).
However, one of the difficulties the animal imitation research mentioned above has from
the viewpoint of robotics is that, while interesting on its own, it does not provide any
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algorithmic insight in the mechanisms underlying the animal's imitation skills which
can be used as guidelines for computational and robotic implementations. Neuro-
physiological research more applicable to the work described in this thesis will be
further described in chapter 6.
2.4 On the mechanisms of imitation
Having addressed the issue of the utility of imitation, the discussion will now move to
the mechanisms that underlie imitation, first of all, to the issues of the different levels at
which imitation can occur, followed by a discussion on the distinction between learning
to imitate and learning by imitation. An analysis of the different subtasks that are
involved in imitation will complete this section.
2.4.1 Levels and types of imitation
There are different levels that imitation can occur at, and these levels do not necessarily
share the same mechanisms (Demiris and Hayes, 1997). A possible categorisation of
imitation acts could be performed along the following three levels:
(A) Basic imitation which can be seen as reproduction of the perceived stimulus,
for example, imitation of body movements or speech sounds.
(B) Functional imitation, for example picking-up an object, moving towards a
door, making a sound to scare off a predator, etc. Essentially, in this level, its
not the exact stimulus that is being imitated but rather the function or effect
that it has.
(C) Internal state imitation i.e. imitation not of the external action but of the
presumed internal state of the partner (for example, making a sad face when
another one is crying, smiling when others laugh). This can also be thought as
empathy, or social attunement.
Trying to differentiate between the different types of imitation has been a recurring-
theme in biological and artificial agent imitation research, and schemes for distinguish-
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ing among them have also been suggested by researchers investigating biological and
artificial imitation. For example, Mitchell (1987) introduces a framework where five
different levels of imitation are distinguished by the processes that "bring about the im¬
itation" (Mitchell, 1987, page 202). Imitation is viewed as a process that moves through
developmental stages, starting from first level imitation (or "mimicry") , which is based
on fundamental processes such as evolution, selection and morphogenesis, and reaching
more high levels, which are based on more abstract processes, for example, fifth level
imitation which is based on planning and the awareness of the other agent's awareness
of the situation. Byrne and Russon (1999) also argues that imitation can occur at
different levels and they distinguish between action-level and program-level imitation:
action-level imitation is viewed as the imitation of basic elements of behaviour, either
alone, or in sequential strings, while program-level imitation is viewed as the imitation
of the organisational structure at any higher level, in a sense the "strategy" that the
demonstrator is adopting. Nehaniv and Dautenhahn (1998) also utilise this distinc¬
tion between program- and action-level imitation but also introduce a level similar
to what was termed as functional imitation earlier on: "effect-level" imitation, which
pays special attention to the "form-filling" aspect of imitation, in which the effects
on the environment rather than particular motions are to be imitated (Nehaniv and
Dautenhahn, 1998, page 65). Similarly, (Miyamoto et al., 1996; Schaal, 1999) point
out that there are several strategies for imitation in artificial systems, starting from
"indiscriminate intrinsic imitation", where the position and (if available) the force tra¬
jectories are to be reproduced in intrinsic space, e.g. joint space, to a strategy that
focuses on understanding the task goal of the demonstrator.
2.4.2 Learning to imitate vs. learning by imitation
When the term 'imitation' is used in animal research, it is frequently associated, at
least implicitly, with the term 'learning', but it is not immediately clear what the
interplay between the two terms is. The distinction that is drawn here postulates
that there are two forms of imitation learning: learning to imitate and learning by
imitation. In the first one, the agent observes a demonstration and its actions are
directed towards finding how to imitate the observed behaviour. Any learning that
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is involved revolves around this search for the appropriate motor commands, i.e. the
imitation mechanism itself is being learned. On the other side, in learning by imitation,
the imitation mechanism is already developed and the agent uses this mechanism in
order to develop further skills, usually what is an appropriate action to perform in a
particular environmental (and social) situation. The problem is moved from how to
imitate, to what and when.
2.4.3 The subtasks of imitation
Having established that imitation is a useful skill to have, and one with many oc¬
currences in nature, it would be useful at this point to try to analyse the individual
subtasks that are involved in imitation. The purpose behind this is twofold: it con¬
structs a framework which will assist in evaluating the robotics, computational and
animal work that will presented next, and it allows for pinpointing later the areas
where the contributions of this thesis reside.
The tasks will be presented in the order in which they would need to be addressed if an
agent is introduced to a new environment (by birth, or by transfer) containing other
agents. For the newcomer, the task of utilising imitation to its benefit has to proceed
through the solution of the subtasks below.
Picking the right agent to imitate
This is a difficult subtask since not all agents are suitable to be imitated, which can
be due to two reasons: their design or their behaviour. First of all, they might be
unsuitable due to their design, i.e. their physical characteristics and capabilities might
be incompatible with the imitator's, potentially rendering imitation impossible. They
can also be unsuitable due to their behaviour, since what is good for the demonstrator
might not be good for the imitator. Even after rejecting the unsuitable ones, there
might be more than one suitable agent left, and a technique for picking one up among
the available ones is not clear1.
1 Humans and animals, by virtue of living in hierarchical societies, frequently utilise external factors
displaying the position of an individual in a society (signs of richness, beauty or strength), or
emotional attachment with the demonstrator.
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Identifying a beneficial behaviour to imitate
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Having picked up a teacher, and assuming that both its nhysical and behavioural char¬
acteristics make imitation possible and useful, the imitator is faced with the subtask of
extracting the beneficial behaviour from the stream of data that results from observing
the teacher. There are both temporal and attentional segmentation issues: on the tem¬
poral side of the segmentation, the beginning and the end of the beneficial behaviour
have to be determined, while on the attentional side, it should be determined which
aspects of the observed behaviour resulted in the benefits that this behaviour carries.
It is not clear yet how people focus their attention during observation with intent to
imitate, although steps towards illuminating this mechanism have been taken: Mataric
and Pomplun (1998) have shown that when people want to imitate demonstrated arm
movements they use internal innate and learned movement models to recreate the
details of the whole arm-posture and movement simply by tracking arm end-point
trajectories.
Matching the behaviour
Having perceived which of the demonstrator's behaviours to imitate, the imitator has
to match the demonstrated behaviour with an equivalent behaviour of its own. The
issues already mentioned earlier under "levels of imitation" (section 2.4.1) become
particularly important here. What "equivalent" is depends on what the imitator is
trying to achieve, and what it is able to achieve due to its particular body structure.
This is known as the correspondence problem (Nehaniv and Dautenhahn, 1998).
There are important representational and algorithmic issues associated with this sub-
task, revolving around how the demonstrated behaviour is processed and stored and
when. More specifically, these issues involve answering the following questions. Is the
demonstrated behaviour that registered in the perceptual systems transformed to a
representation that the motor systems can use directly or is there some intermediate
(possibly symbolic) representation? How could a direct transformation occur and how
would the perceptual and motor systems interact in order to perform it? When would
this transformation occur: immediately upon registration in the perceptual systems or
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when reproduction is required? If there is an intermediate representation, what would
its requirements be?
If the demonstrated behaviour is a composite one, addressing these issues might involve
decomposing the demonstrated behaviour to its constituents. Is the imitator capable
of reproducing all the components and does (s)he know how? If yes, a simple grouping
of component actions will suffice in order to reproduce the observed behaviour, but in
the opposing case, the reproduction will involve a combination of known (if any) and
components that need to be learned.
Analysing the reproduced behaviour
Once the observed behaviour has been matched and reproduced, a post-production
analysis should take place for verification and self-improvement purposes. First of all,
it should be verified whether the reproduced behaviour did achieve the goals that it
was set to achieve. If not, then adaptation mechanisms should be activated in order
to account for the failure and attempt to correct it.
2.5 Imitation in robotics
In this section, imitation research that has been performed in the field of robotics will
be described, starting from work in robotic assembly tasks, followed by mobile robotics
imitation work. In the first instance, the demonstrator is a human while in the second
one it is another mobile robot.
2.5.1 Skill acquisition through human demonstration
The potential of imitation to ease the robot programming process was recognised by
robotics researchers who realised that instead of going through lengthy and complex
programming, robots could learn how to perform various tasks by observing a human
demonstrator. Research by (Ikeuchi and Suehiro, 1992; Suehiro and Ikeuchi, 1992;
Kuniyoshi et ah, 1994; Hovland et al., 1996; Kaiser and Dillmann, 1996; Kang and
Ikeuchi, 1997; Yeasin and Chaudhuri, 1997) has successfully used human demonstra¬
tion to program robots to perform assembly tasks. This work will be presented below,
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starting with the systems that utilise visual perception in order to acquire the demon¬
strator's task knowledge, followed by systems where the knowledge is given to the
system directly through the use of a manipulandum, and ending with systems where
the motor system's capabilities and limitations are taken into consideration during the
acquisition of the knowledge.
Skill acquisition through visual perception
One of the first successful systems for robot learning by imitation and probably the
best example of skill acquisition through visual perception is the system developed by
Kuniyoshi and colleagues (Kuniyoshi et ah, 1992; Kuniyoshi and Inoue, 1993; Kuniy-
oshi et ah, 1994). This system consists of a triple-camera setup which observes a
human demonstrator performing an assembly task, in particular constructing various
structures using blocks. The system recognises the initial environmental state (the
positions of all objects in the workspace) prior to any human demonstration. The hu¬
man demonstrator performs the task from start to finish, with no interruptions and his
hand is located and tracked by the visual system. When the hand approaches a target
(block), a "meaningful change detection" routine is initiated. This takes a snapshot of
the target before and after the operation, and in conjunction with the environmental
model, the system detects the type of operation that has been performed. Finally, the
system extracts a high-level symbolic description of the task that the demonstrator
performed. The benefit of doing this is that the task description is now applicable also
to environmental conditions that differ from the ones present during the demonstration
(for example, different positions for the objects). Although limited to pick and place
operations, this system was one of the first ones that had the ability to handle recogni¬
tion of human operations in real-time. Similar systems were also built by (Yeasin and
Chaudhuri, 1997; Dillmann et al., 1995).
Systems that were capable of assembly plan construction from observation (APO) were
also constructed by (Ikeuchi and Suehiro, 1992; Suehiro and Ikeuchi, 1992), but instead
of classifying the human actions from the movements of the demonstrator, the system
was focusing on the transitions between different environmental states as perceived by
a range or vision sensor, and was attempting to build a 'task model' which was then
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matched against a database of known abstract task models in order to generate an
assembly program.
Direct skill acquisition
In the approach described above, the actions of the demonstrator were perceived and
analysed through a visual subsystem. Other researchers have circumvented this stage
by providing the commands that were performed in a form directly usable by the
robot (Kaiser and Dillmann, 1996; Kaiser et al., 1995; Friedrich and Dillmann, 1995),
in what was termed robot programming by demonstration. There are commonalities
with the approaches described above in that the demonstrator does provide example
task solutions, but in robot programming by demonstration this is done through the
operation of a device that directly controls the robot. A 3D joystick was used (Kaiser
et ah, 1995) by the demonstrator to perform the task, and the performed actions were
recorded and played back when the robot was required to perform the task on its own.
Several other devices have also been used in order to transfer the task data from the
human demonstrator to the robot, including position sensors that are attached to the
body of the demonstrator (Hovland et ah, 1996), and cybergloves (Lee and Xu, 1996).
The different approaches are not, of course, mutually exclusive and there has been work
that utilises more than one input device to enhance the quality of the task recognition
(Kang and Ikeuchi, 1997).
Involving the motor system
In the previous examples, the motor system and any constraints it might have are not
taken into account during the perception process. The flow of information is unidirec¬
tional, from perception to motor commands. Kawato's bidirectional theory (Kawato,
1992) allows information to flow from as well as to the motor system: the dynamical
properties of the motor system are taken into account during movement planning and
generation. Movement trajectories are represented as sets of "via-points" that the
imitator has to go through in order to smoothly follow this trajectory; demonstrated
movements are recognised if the number and locations of the via-points extracted dur¬
ing the demonstration match with one of the observer's existing sets. This approach has
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been demonstrated in the learning of the Japanese game "Kendama" by a humanoid-
type arm (Miyamoto et al., 1996) as well as recognising words from cursive handwriting
(Wada and Kawato, 1995), and it was one of the first approaches that had the very
interesting property that the motor system is utilized in order to do the perception
too. The importance of involving the motor system in the perception of an action is
also advocated by (Schaal, 1999).
2.5.2 Skill acquisition through robot demonstration
The advantages of imitation were also utilised in a different domain, that of mobile
robots (Dautenhahn, 1994; Demiris, 1994; Hayes and Demiris, 1994; Dautenhahn, 1995;
Demiris and Hayes, 1996; Billard and Hayes, 1998; Billard and Dautenhahn, 1998;
Billard, 1999). The tasks revolve around the acquisition of navigation skills, identifying
good and bad teachers and grounding language. These will be described below.
One of the first examples of using imitation in mobile robots was in the context of
learning how to negotiate the different types of corners in a maze by imitating another
mobile robot, knowledgeable in the task (Demiris, 1994; Hayes and Demiris, 1994).
Two robots were placed in a maze environment: the teacher one knows how to handle
each corner2 while the learner does not. The learner is equipped with a camera and
utilises it in order to maintain a distance between itself and the imitator, effectively
imitating the movements of the demonstrator in the two dimensional plane. While it
is doing that, it associates the actions that it is performing due to the imitation, with
the environmental configurations that it is perceiving, thus learning which is the right
action to perform at each environmental state.
This approach of learning through movement imitation has been taken further by
the work of (Dautenhahn, 1994, 1995). The learner robot follows the teacher robot
by trying to establish and maintain contact with it in a hilly landscape environment
("Huegellandschaft"). This environment adds an interesting new dimension to the two
dimensional scenario used above: the hilly parts and the inclination that the robots
have to assume while traversing them gives the ability to add an energy consumption
There are three different situations, left-turn corners, right-turn corners - both at ninety degrees,
and no corners at all.
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or "movement difficulty" parameter to the scenario. A robot learner following a ro¬
bot teacher in this environment learns whether this teacher is good or bad, based on
whether following it results in high or low consumption. What Dautenhahn (1995) has
shown is that imitation can be used to probe the identity of other robots in a social
environment3, in a similar way that Meltzoff has been postulating for human infants.
Imitation has also been used to ground a simple language (Billard and Hayes, 1998;
Billard and Dautenhahn, 1998; Billard, 1999): the learner follows the teacher and learns
to associate a vocabulary transmitted by the teacher (through a radio modem) with
its perceptions. This work demonstrated that a simple movement imitation strategy
can also be a useful technique for learning a language, since it gets the two robots to
share the same environmental context.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, theoretical and empirical imitation work on robots and animals was
presented. Work in assembly robots has followed a traditional "perceive-recognise-
reproduce" cycle, while mobile robotics work has attempted to circumvent the re¬
cognition part of the cycle and try to learn additional skills utilising the imitation
mechanism as a starting point.
Apart from (Dautenhahn, 1994, 1995), the majority of the robot work has concentrated
on the matching mechanism and identifying a beneficial behaviour to imitate subtasks,
and has ignored the issues of picking the right demonstrator to imitate. This thesis
will also focus on the matching mechanism, and assume that the demonstrator has
already been selected. In contrast with the robot assembly work mentioned earlier, it
will attempt to adhere to the data available on the mechanisms underlying movement
matching and imitation in biological systems.
There has been work investigating imitation in human infants and adults from psycho¬
logical, pathological and brain scanning perspectives, and in monkeys from a neuro-
physiological perspective. Description of this work is embedded in the chapters that
3 Is the robot I am following a conspecific (does it behave in a similar way to me), is it a good or bad
teacher for me (are its actions beneficial for me)?
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In this chapter, a computational architecture inspired by Meltzoff's AIM hypothesis
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1983, 1989) will be presented followed by a description of its
implementation on a stereo-vision robotic head, in the context of robotic imitation of a
human demonstrator's head movements. The chapter concludes with an examination
of the biological plausibility of the computational architecture that was implemented.
3.1 Background
In the previous chapter, a range of robotic attempts to imitation were described, most of
which fell into the category of what is termed "passive imitation", where the imitation
process proceeds serially through three stages: perception, recognition, reproduction.
Approaches by (Hayes and Demiris, 1994; Dautenhahn, 1994, 1995; Demiris and Hayes,
1996; Billard, 1999) have attempted to follow a different approach by trying to devise
imitation mechanisms that will work directly without a recognition stage. This line
of work is relatively new, but it makes an important distinction: the imitator is not
imitating because it is understanding what the demonstrator is showing, but rather,
it is understanding it because it is imitating. Imitation is used as a mechanism for
bootstrapping further learning and understanding.
The distinction between the two approaches is new in the field of robotics but not in
psychology. Researchers studying imitation in infants have made a similar distinction
while formulating hypotheses regarding the mechanisms underlying early infant im-
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itation. Meltzoff and Moore (1977) first reported young infants, between 12 and 21
days old in the original report, being able to imitate both facial and manual gestures,
including tongue protrusion, mouth opening and lip protrusion. The experimenters
suggested that the infants are able to represent visual and proprioceptive information
in a form common to both modalities. These results were against the popular belief
at the time, that infants are only capable of imitation after 8-12 months from birth,
and that imitation abilities are a result of the infant's cognitive development. How¬
ever, the phenomenon proved to be a robust one, and was replicated in many other
laboratories1, and shown to be present even in newborn infants (Meltzoff and Moore,
1989, 1983; Reissland, 1988). There is also a report of the same phenomenon with a
infant chimpanzee (Myowa, 1996).
Various hypotheses regarding the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon were com¬
pared by Meltzoff and Moore (1989), including the "innate release mechanism (IRM)
model" which postulates that the demonstrator's behaviour simply triggers and re¬
leases equivalent fixed-action-patterns (FAPs) by the infant. The IRM model relies on
the existence of a set of FAPs, but there isn't a precise specification of what this set
is (Meltzoff and Moore, 1989). IRM was judged to be an unlikely candidate for two
reasons:
• The range of actions imitated was wide, which would mean that the infant would
have to have a large number of FAPs in its repertoire.
• The fact that the infants attempt to and succeed in improving the quality of the
imitated act (Meltzoff, 1981).
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1983, 1989) put forward the "Active Intermodal Mapping" hy¬
pothesis which postulates that the infants use the demonstrator's states, perceived
visually, as a target against which to direct their own body states, perceived proprio-
ceptively. This hypothesis is particularly attractive in the case of facial or head move¬
ments for which the infant has no other way of knowing the state of its own body other
than proprioception. The existence of a mechanism that matches stimuli between dif¬
ferent modalities has also been advocated by Maurer (1993), but while Meltzoff's AIM
1 For a complete list see (Meltzoff and Moore, 1994)
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mechanism appears to be activated as a choice made by the infant, Maurer argues
that the infant's intermodal matching of stimuli is a by-product of what was termed
"neonatal synesthesia": the infant confuses input from the different senses. The infant,
it is argued, does not register the modality that the stimuli appeared in but rather it
responds to changes in the stimulation's intensity summed over all of the undifferen¬
tiated sensory modalities. Synesthesia is hypothesised to be a normal stage of early
infant development: it is argued that the primary sensory cortex is not very specialised
in infants, but with development it becomes so, the senses become more differentiated,
and "true" intermodal matching develops. Whatever the exact mechanism is, the abil¬
ity of the infant to match stimuli between modalities is well documented, and has been
demonstrated between other modalities in addition to the visual/proprioceptive cases
mentioned earlier, for example tactual/visual intermodal matching (Meltzoff, 1981,
1993).
At this stage it is useful to draw parallels between this work and the assembly and
mobile robot imitation work described earlier. There are a lot of commonalities between
the passive imitation model in robots and the IRM model in infants. Both rely on the
existence of a set of predefined action patterns, which are triggered after the perception
and classification of the visual input. This set, at least in the robot work (as described
in the previous chapter), is fixed, and frequently tuned to the requirements of the task
in hand.
The mobile robot imitation work (Hayes and Demiris, 1994; Dautenhahn, 1995) is
closer to the AIM hypothesis model, since the robots do not attempt to recognise the
type of action performed by the demonstrator, but imitate directly. However there is
a difference between AIM and the approach followed by the mobile robot researchers:
the robot imitators do not attempt to match the demonstrator's state with their own
(as AIM suggests), but rather try to maintain a quantity constant, which in the case of
robot following is the distance between the two robots, i.e. there is a "virtual tethering"
between them.
The next section presents a computational architecture that follows the AIM model
more closely, followed by the implementation of this architecture on a head-movement
imitation scenario.
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The basic components of the architecture designed are shown in figure 3.1.
Demonstrator Imitator
6
Figure 3.1: The computational architecture for passive movement imitation
The visual stimuli from the visual perception modules are fed into the posture es¬
timation module, which at each iteration outputs the current postural state of the
demonstrator2. This posture stream is stored in memory after being filtered so only
the "representative postures" are retained. The postures are then fed into the move¬
ment matching module which outputs the motor commands needed to match these
postures with equivalent postures by the imitator, perceived proprioceptively. Each
of these modules will be described in turn in the following subsections, right after the
presentation of the scenario that was selected and the robotic platform that was used.
3.3 Experiments
3.3.1 Experimental scenario - human head movement imitation
The scenario chosen to test the architecture was human head movement imitation.
A human demonstrator positions his head within the robotic head's field of view,
2 Posture is defined here as the set of angles between all connected body parts of the agent.
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and performs a series of head movements while the robot remains still. When the
demonstrator completes the head movement(s) it signals the robot (via a keyboard)
to start the imitation. This scenario was chosen since it places the imitator in the
same situation that Meltzoff's subjects were in: while the robot has access to the
demonstrator's states visually, it does not have any means of perceiving its own states
other than through proprioception.
3.3.2 Experimental platform - ESCHeR
ESCHeR (E[tl] S[tereo] C[ompact] He[ad for] R[obot vision], figure 3.3) was designed
and built in Japan, at the Electrotechnical Laboratory (Kuniyoshi et al., 1995a), and
was largely inspired by the properties of biological visual systems. This binocular head
is equipped with foveated wide-angle lenses (Kuniyoshi et al., 1995b) which exhibit a
wide field of view (~ 120°) for global observation and a high resolution fovea
(« 20pix/deg) for precise attention, and can perform motions with peak velocity and
acceleration comparable to human capabilities (AOOdeg/sec) for vergence velocity).
ESCHeR is capable of real time image processing and for the purposes of these ex¬
periments, it was computing the optical flow at frame rate (30 Hz) in 1600 locations
(40x40) for both left and right images. Routines developed for tracking experiments
(Rougeaux and Kuniyoshi, 1997) were re-used here to calculate the optical flow.
Figure 3.2: The human robot scenario
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Figure 3.3: ESCHeR: ETL's high performance stereo-head (Kuniyoshi et al., 1995a).
3.3.3 Architecture implementation
This section describes how the computational architecture was implemented for this
scenario. First, the perception and representation subsystems will be described, fol¬
lowed by the description of the matching subsystem.
Perception and representation modules
The demonstrator's head pan and tilt rotations are estimated using optical flow inform¬
ation and Kalman filtering (Brown, 1995). To simplify the problem, it is assumed that
the optical flow observed during head motions is mainly produced by the rotational
components. The head translations are neglected, since it is impossible for the robot
to imitate them, and the demonstrator is asked to minimise any such translations.
The flow fields induced by the head rotations are retrieved using a standard gradient-
based optical flow algorithm combined with an IIR recursive filter described in Fleet
and Langley (1996). The vertical and horizontal components (u,v) are computed using
a flow segmentation algorithm described in Rougeaux and Kuniyoshi (1997). Then
the pan and tilt rotations of the observed head are estimated using the following state
equations in two independent Kalman filters:
dt2
QpankJr\ = Qpanf- Udtuk 4 - fjk (3.1)
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dt2
@tiltk+1 = @tiltk VdtVk 4 — frfc (3-2)
where gk and hk are Gaussian white-noise processes modelling the acceleration, and
U,V are constants that take into account the resolution of the lenses (Kuniyoshi et al.,
1995b). Since high-precision posture estimation is not required in this experiment, no
calibration is needed, and U and V can be roughly tuned to limit the amplitude of the
head rotations.
A refinement process was added after the realisation that storing all the postures
(estimates of which are acquired at frame rate - 30 Hz), a large amount of which are
consecutive ones, is not necessary. This process selects the postures that are sufficient
to define the sequence to be reproduced, the "representative" ones. The extraction
of the representative postures utilises a simple algorithm which keeps the posture in
memory if the posture is a local min/max value in any of its constituent axes3. Note
that, although in general there exist possible axes of analysis both at the perceptual
(allocentric) and the motor (egocentric) frames of reference, the correspondence is
simplified since the two agents are facing each other, which means that the perceptual
and motor frames (centered at the heads of the two agents) are simply mirror images
of each other.
Matching Module
In order to achieve the target postures that were stored by the perceptual and memory
modules, the target posture is compared with the current posture, as measured by
the robot's self-posture estimation module, and depending on the relation between the
pan and tilt components of the target and the current posture, one or more motor
commands of the form "move upwards", "move leftwards" etc. are initiated, and
remain active until the module determines (based on proprioceptive signals) that the
target posture has been reached. The self-posture estimation is done by having the
robot head initialise to (0,0) at the beginning of the experiment and using the values
of the encoders to get current estimates of the self posture.
3 Specifically, if there exists an axis (either x or y in this case) so that the value of the posture at
frame has the same relationship (one of "smaller than" or "greater than") with the value of the
posture at frame+1 as it has with the posture value at frame-1
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There are two main reasons for having the matching process work like this:
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• Perturbation tolerance: even if the movement is perturbed during execution,
the body part can still reach the intended target since the commands issued are
dependent on the difference between the current and the final posture, and are
not output on an open-loop, feed-forward manner.
• Biological plausibility: there is some evidence that at least some types of limb
movements are controlled by constantly comparing an estimate of the current
postural state of the limb with a target value (Desmurget and Prablanc, 1997).
The issue of biological plausibility will be revisited at the discussion section at
the end of the chapter.
3.3.4 How does the system perform?
Experiments were performed with humans sitting in front of ESCHeR and performing
various head movements (figure 3.2). An example movement sequence is shown in
figure 3.4: the demonstrator, starting from a face-to-face position with the robot head,
rotates his head left-right twice, before returning to his initial position, in a sequence
roughly resembling a 'no-no' gesture. Snapshots 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 roughly correspond to
the 'representative' postures extracted during the demonstration process. Figure 3.5
shows snapshots of the robot going through these postures.
The system is able to cope with the imitation of a variety of human head movements
irrespective of the duration of the movement and its speed. It was observed that, by
activating the representative posture extraction module, apart from cutting down on
memory requirements, the robot was performing a more smooth movement during the
imitation phase. This was due to the fact that the robot was now issuing start/stop
commands less frequently since there were fewer intermediate postures to go through.
This has to be traded against the desired quality of the trajectory of the movement
since the representative module tends to take the shortest route between two points,
therefore not following circular segments along the trajectory precisely. For example,
if the demonstrator performs a circular movement with his head (a "head roll"), the
resulting movement will be more of a diamond shape rather than circular, since the
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Figure 3.4: The demonstrated head sequence
four postures that will be extracted will be the four points of change of direction4. Any
compromise in quality can also be avoided (if required) by deactivating the represent¬
ative posture extraction module, or by implementing a mechanism that, in addition to
the representative postures above, includes sample postures at regular intervals. The
activation of such mechanism can also be made dependent on the levels of attention of
the observer so that parts of the demonstration significant or interesting to the observer
can be sampled at smaller intervals.
Since the robot is capable of movement only in the pan and tilt direction, rotational
movements along the third axis could not be imitated. Since the system assumes that
the optical flow that is observed is due to mainly rotational movements, it interprets
optical flow due to translational movements as the rotational movements that would
have generated the equivalent optical flow.
4 This is usually avoided in many robotic implementations since these 'via points' are not reached,
but rounded off, allowing, for example, a polygon sequence to imitate a circle very well.
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Figure 3.5: The resulting robot head movement. The arrows indicate where the robot
head point towards at each snapshot. A video clip with this demonstration can be
found at http://www.dai.ed.ac.uk/daidb/people/homes/johnde/
Videos with example movements and their imitation by the robot head can be found
in http://www.dai.ed.ac.uk/daidb/people/homes/johnde/. The results of implementing
this architecture in this scenario have been replicated (Schofield, 1998) with a different
robot platform, consisting of a robotic head with a single camera.
3.4 Discussion
The architecture above has the following advantages: it is general enough to be able to
imitate any kind of demonstrated movement that the hardware of the imitator system
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can afford. It does so by having a very low requirement on needed information: the
postures of the demonstrator, perceived visually, and those of the imitator, perceived
proprioceptively. The choice of posture as the unit of representation is not arbitrary.
The postures of the demonstrator and imitator are always well defined and computable.
In addition, postures have a high biological significance: animals frequently use them
for communicative purposes (Bruce and Green, 1990; Groothuis, 1993), e.g. threat,
appeasement and mating postures, and human body language. Their biological signi¬
ficance might even have led to the development of specialised feature detectors that
respond selectively to postures. Indeed, work by Perrett and his colleagues has shown
the existence of cells in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) area of the monkey's brain,
that respond when a demonstrator assumes certain postures, for example, cells that
are responsive to specific head views (Perrett et al., 1990, 1991). Cells selective to
other body parts have also been reported (Tanaka, 1993), see also (Carey et ah, 1997)
for an overview.
Similarly, as Tillery et al. (1996) point out, physiological studies throughout the so¬
matosensory system have revealed discharges related to own static limb postures: unit
activity is usually monotonically related to changes in joint angle. The degree of
accuracy of a proprioception-based estimate of the static posture is not completely
determined, and it has been shown that it improves when visual information about
the state of the body part is also available (Desmurget et al., 1995), or is even being
partially substituted by it when proprioception is not available in deafferented patients
(Ghez and Sainburg, 1995). Scott and Kalaska (1995) demonstrated that cell activity
in the monkey motor cortex is highly sensitive to changes in arm posture even if the
resulting hand trajectory remains similar.
Finally, evidence that, at least some type of movements are controlled on the basis of
a joint angular error has been provided by Desmurget and Prablanc (1997) who have
shown that three-dimensional upper-limb movements are controlled via a mechanism
that is comparing an estimate of the current postural state with a target value.
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In this chapter, a computational architecture that closely follows Meltzoff's AIM hy¬
pothesis was described, and its implementation was presented for a scenario featuring
imitation of human head movements. The architecture has low signal requirements,
and it relies on the existence of always computable information, i.e. the postures of
the demonstrator and the imitator. By relying on information known to exist in the
human brain and requiring only an intermodal matching mechanism that is known to
be within the capabilities of infants, the architecture manifests itself as an attractive
model for the infant imitation abilities. Could it be a universal model for movement
imitation for later ages too? There are two issues that are against this. First, by virtue
of its design, there is no concept of known and novel movements: all demonstrations
are processed and imitated through the same mechanism. In addition, there is a clear
separation between perception and action: the motor system is involved only at the
late stages of imitation. Both these aspects have been challenged by recent biological
data, and in particular human brain activation data, that indicate that actions are pro¬
cessed differently if they are known to the imitator than if they are novel, and that the
motor system is already actively involved during the perception phase of the imitation
process (these data will be described, among others, in chapter 6). The next chapter
introduces an architecture that tackles these issues, and explains these biological data
better. However, it would be premature to dismiss this "passive" architecture as in¬
valid. In chapter 5, this architecture will be combined with the "active" architecture of





In this chapter, an architecture that tightly couples the perception and the generation
of an action will be described. The concept of internal forward models will be intro¬
duced, and the imitation architecture will subsequently be developed as a parallel set
of behaviours paired with forward models. Using a dynamics simulator of a thirteen
degrees of freedom robot it will be demonstrated how such an architecture can be used
to generate an action as well as perceiving it when generated by others.
4.2 Background
The architecture that will be described in the next section makes extensive use of the
concepts of behaviours and of forward models.
A forward model of a controlled object (a 'plant' as it is known in the control literature)
is a function that, given the current state of the plant and a control command to
be applied on it, outputs the predicted next state (figure 4.1). Forward models are
frequently used in control engineering, since they provide at least two major advantages:
• Provision of rapid internal feedback: using a forward model the outcome ofmotor
commands can be predicted and used immediately in an internal feedback loop,
making feedback control possible even in situations where, due to large delays
in the provision of real feedback (the typical situation in sensorimotor cases),
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feedback control would be infeasible.
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• Controller improvement through mental practice: the results of the controller
commands can be predicted and acted upon without actually executing the com¬
mands.
For the purposes of this thesis, a behaviour is defined1 as a function that, given the
current state of the plant and the target goal(s), outputs the control commands that
are needed in order to achieve or maintain the goal(s). Target goals might be implicit
or need to be made explicit. For example, for a pick-object behaviour, the target
object to be picked up must be stated explicitly and fed to the behaviour, while for
a head-nodding-yes behaviour, the target goal (i.e. moving the head downwards) is
already defined implicitly and the current state is enough to determine the motor
commands needed to execute this behaviour. A behaviour is similar to what is known
in the control literature as an 'inverse model', however, contrary to behaviours, inverse
models do not usually utilise feedback about the current state, but output commands in
a feed-forward manner. The boundary between behaviour and inverse model however,
is not a rigid one since, as (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998) pointed out, "even control
strategies, such as feedback control, which do not explicitly invoke an inverse model
can be thought of as implicitly constructing an inverse model".
Combinations of forward and inverse models have been used for various applications
such as arm trajectory formation (Wada and Kawato, 1993) and supervised learning
(Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992) among others. Internal forward and inverse models have
also been hypothesised to exist in the human brain (Wolpert et al., 1998), where they
are utilised for a variety of tasks including sensorimotor integration (Wolpert et al.,
1995), and motor control (Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998).
4.3 The architecture
In this section, the active imitation architecture will be described, starting initially
from how this architecture can be used to generate behaviours, followed by how such
1 Note that there are several other definitions of the word 'behaviour' in other research areas, for
example behaviour-based robotics (Arkin, 1998), and ethology (Hinde, 1982)















Figure 4.1: Input-output diagrams for forward models (a) and behaviours (b)
an architecture is used in order to understand demonstrated behaviour.
The fundamental structure of the architecture is a behaviour paired with a forward
model (figure 4.2). In order to execute a behaviour within this structure, the behaviour
module receives information about the current state (and, optionally, of the target
goal(s)), and it outputs the motor commands that it believes are necessary to achieve
or maintain the implicit or explicit target goal(s). The forward model provides an
estimate of the next state which is fed back to the behaviour, allowing it to adjust any






if in perception mode.















Figure 4.2: The basic building block: a pairing between a behaviour and a forward
model
2 An example of this, as will be shown in the next section (implementation), is adapting the gains of
the PID controller used to implement a behaviour in order to achieve different movement speeds.
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More importantly, the same structure can be used in order to match a visually perceived
demonstrated behaviour with the imitator's equivalent motor one. This is done by
feeding the demonstrator's current state as perceived by the imitator to the behaviour
modules and having it generate the motor commands that it would output if it was
in that state and wanted to execute this particular behaviour. The motor commands
are inhibited from being sent to the motor system. The forward model outputs an
estimated next state which is a prediction of what the demonstrator's next state will
be. This prediction is compared with the actual demonstrator's state at the next time
step. This comparison results in an error signal which can be used to increase or
decrease the behaviour's confidence value, which is an indicator of how confident the
particular imitator's behaviour is that it can match the demonstrated behaviour.
Figure 4.3 shows the complete architecture which consists of several of the structures
that were described above, operating in parallel. When the demonstrator executes a be¬
haviour, the perceived states are fed into the imitator's available behaviours which gen¬
erate motor commands that are sent to the forward models (relevant only to body parts
related to the particular behaviour). The forward models generate predictions about
the demonstrator's next state which are compared with the actual demonstrator's state
at the next time step, and the error signal resulting from this comparison affects the
confidence values of the behaviours. At the end of the demonstration (or earlier if re¬
quired) the behaviour with the highest confidence value, i.e. the one that is the closest
match to the demonstrator is selected.
As an example, lets say that the imitator currently has four behaviours in its rep¬
ertoire: head up and down and arm up and down, and the state space of the agent
consists of (head(up, rest, down}, armjup, rest, down}) and the demonstrator starts
from the rest position both for the arm and head. When the demonstration is ini¬
tiated, the state of the demonstrator is fed to the four behaviours. Each behaviour
assumes that state and outputs the motor commands that will achieve their respective
target goal (e.g. the head up behaviour will apply the appropriate forces to the neck
joints to raise the head). Each of the forward models receives the commands from its
associated behaviour and calculates what the next state would be if these commands
were executed (a description on how is this achieved can be found at section 4.4.3).
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Figure 4.3: The architecture consists of behaviours paired with forward models
In this example, the four forward models would output (head up), (head down), (arm
up), and (arm down) respectively, which are the predictions on what the next state
of those body parts of the demostrator will be. These outputs are compared with the
actual state that the demonstrator assumes next, and the ones that are correct result
into reinforcement for the corresponding behaviour. The following section describes
experiments demonstrating this architecture using a 13 DOF dynamically simulated
robot.
4.4 Experiments
This section presents and analyses the results of implementing the architecture above
on a dynamics simulator of a thirteen degrees of freedom robot using as a test set the
movements of the International Standard Semaphore Code (ISSC). The results show
that the architecture is capable of correctly selecting the appropriate behaviour even
when the demonstrator and the imitator have significantly different dynamics. This is
demonstrated both in the context of single movements ('letters') and in sequences of
movements ('words').
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A thirteen degrees of freedom simulated robot was constructed and its dynamics sim¬
ulated using the DynaMechs dynamical simulation library (McMillan et ah, 1995).
'Bouncer' (figure 4.4) has three degrees of freedom at the neck joint, three at each
shoulder, one at each elbow, and one at each wrist.
Figure 4.4: 'Bouncer', the thirteen DoF dynamically simulated robot
Bouncer operates under the effect of gravity, so if no forces are applied to a joint, the
connected body part moves toward the ground. Movement is also subject to friction
at the joints. The full experimental platform (figure 4.5) consists of two simulated
robots, a demonstrator and an imitator, with similar body structure. In some of the
experiments that follow, the dynamics of the two robots were the same, while in other
they were different. The imitator is allowed to read the demonstrator's postural states
(joint angles) in a crude simulation of visual capabilities. To account for the fact that in
the case of the imitator, real vision and proprioception never result in perfectly correct
values of the visually perceived demonstrator states and proprioceptively perceived
imitator states, uniformly-distributed random noise in the range of [-10%, +10%] is
added to both of them before they become available to the imitator.
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Figure 4.5: The full platform - demonstrator is top left, imitator top-right, and the
six windows below display the behaviours that the imitator is currently generating
internally; the windows currently display letters E, N, L, K, I, E, T and E respectively
4.4.2 Implementation domain
The ISSC is an alphabet signalling system based on having the arms extended in vari¬
ous positions/postures representing each of the letters of the alphabet. The test set
which will be used here is the set of movements that, starting from a rest position for
the arms, achieve the various postures of the ISSC. Appendix A shows the correspond¬
ence between the final states of the movements and letters3. For example, in figure 4.5
the eight windows are a snapshot of behaviours which currently show movement to¬
wards letters E, N, L, K, I, E, T, and E respectively. There is no standardised set of
movements used in research of movement imitation (although interesting suggestions,
such as the Macarena dance (Mataric et al., 1998a,b; Demiris and Mataric, 1998) have
been put forward). The reason for selecting this as a test set is twofold:
• It is a well defined set of movements.
• It has the capacity to support movement combinations of arbitrary length in
a meaningful, principled way, since there is a correspondence between the final
states of each movement and alphabet letters, thus the capacity to form syllables,
3 The formal ISSC involves holding a flag in each hand but this is not used here.
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4.4.3 Implementation of the architecture
This section describes how the architecture was implemented for these experiments.
This involves the description of the implementation of three architecture components:
the behaviours, the forward models, and the confidence building formula.
Implementation of the behaviours
Behaviours were implemented using a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control¬
ler, that drives the controlled body part(s) through the key postures constituting the
behaviour. The PID controllers, one for each of the thirteen controlled joints, output
torque values which are calculated by summing three terms:
T(t)=Tp(f)+Ti(t) + Td(t) (4.1)
where Tp(t), Tj(i), and T(/(/,j are the proportional, integral, and derivative terms re¬
spectively, all of which are dependent on the error between the current state and the
target state. More specifically, if we take e(t), the error at time t, to be the difference
between the target state and the plant's state at time t, then the formulas for the three
parts are as follow:
• The proportional part is a simple feedback-based term:
Tp(t) = Kpe(t) (4.2)
• The integral part is given by
Ti(t) = Ktf e(t)dt (4.3)
and is introduced to allow a system that has an error in the steady-state to take
corrective action, even if the error is very small, provided that the error had the
same sign over a long period of time
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• The derivative part is given by
Td{t) =Kd^ (4.4)
and is used in order to anticipate the future behaviour of the error signal by using
corrective action based on the rate of change in the error signal. This has the
effect of reducing the undesirable overshoot and time it takes for the controlled
object to settle at the target values (in this case, angles).
An important issue to note is that the PID controllers perform best within a specific
range of gain values; if they are not tuned within this range, they perform sub-optimally
or might even lead to a destabilization of the controlled plant. In the experiments
reported below, the optimal gains were determined experimentally, although techniques
for the automatic tuning of the controllers also exist (Hagglund and Astrom, 1996).
The gain parameters Kp, Ki and Kd of equations 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 all start having
their optimal settings, but are allowed to adapt in order to reduce the prediction error
between the anticipated states produced from internally executed behaviours and per¬
ceived demonstrator states. A simple adaptation mechanism was implemented for this:
at each iteration, if the prediction for a joint angle value proves to be different from the
actual value, the corresponding gain Kp for the PID controller that controls that joint
angle is increased or reduced (depending on whether the prediction underestimated
or overestimated the actual value) by a small constant amount4. However, although
the gain parameters are allowed to fluctuate, (experimentally determined) upper and
lower bounds are imposed in order to prevent the controller from outputting very high
torque values and destabilising the plant. As it will be demonstrated later, this renders
the perception of particular instances of some behaviours impossible.
Implementation of the forward models
The DynaMechs simulation package (McMillan et al., 1995) includes libraries for sim¬
ulating rigid body dynamics, and these were used in order to implement the forward
models. The procedure used is based on Featherstone's original Articulated Body (AB)
This usually amounts to 0.25% of the initial optimal settings
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dynamics algorithm for simulating the dynamics of chains of rigid bodies (Featherstone,
1983) but includes modifications that improve the efficiency of the computation of AB
inertias (McMillan and Orin, 1995). The procedure involves four steps:
• Applying the forces supplied by the behaviour, taking into account the current
state (joint positions and velocities) of the robot;
• Calculating the forces exerted (including joint friction and gravity) and the AB
inertias that are present in each joint;
• Calculating the resulting accelerations recursively for each body part starting
from the torso and moving towards the wrist;
• Calculating the new state (joint positions and velocities);
Details of the equations used by DynaMechs to calculate the above are given in (Mc¬
Millan and Orin, 1995; McMillan, 1994).
Although in the experiments reported here, the forward models are directly coded
in, they can also be learned by randomly generating motor commands, and using
the resulting actual state as the target output state for the forward model, in what
is sometimes called "motor babbling" (Bullock et al., 1993; Jordan and Rumelhart,
1992) which is considered an important stage in the development of infants (Meltzoff
and Moore, 1997; van der Meer et al., 1995)
Confidence building
The forward models output predictions for each of the joints, which are compared to
the actual values that come at the next time step. The prediction error is given by:
N
E(t) = NW - P%i(t)I (4.5)
i=1
where Xi(t) is the actual value of the demonstrator's joint angle (with the noise added)
at time t, and pxi(t) is the predicted value that was given by the forward model for
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time t. N is the number of joints involved in this behaviour. The confidence value of
the behaviour is then accumulated according to the following update rule:
where C(t) is the confidence of a behaviour at time t, A is a constant threshold value,
which is set experimentally, and k is a gains constant, which is also set experimentally.
The reasoning behind adopting this formula is that reinforcement should be related to
how well or not a behaviour is predicting the perceived demonstrator states. Equation
4.6 gives a higher reward value to predictions closer to the perceived state than to ones
that, although acceptable, are further away. Similarly with negative reinforcement -
larger errors in the prediction carry higher penalties than smaller ones.
4.4.4 Experimental results
Two sets of experiments were performed; one set where the behaviours demonstrated
were single movements (one letter), and one set where the demonstrated behaviours
were sequences of movements (words). Each set of experiments was performed under
three experimental conditions:
L-L/H-H : Imitator and demonstrator have similar dynamics by having similar
weight characteristics, either lightweight (L) or heavyweight (H). L and H are
100% different, i.e. H has double the weight of L.
L-H : The demonstrator is lightweight and the imitator is heavyweight.
H-L : The reverse of L-H.
This grouping of different dynamics into lightweight and heavyweight bands was made
since small variations in weight do not have any noticeable effect.
A final set of experiments demonstrates the limitations of this architecture; behaviours
demonstrated at speeds unattainable by the imitator are not perceived although within
the repertoire of the imitator.
C(t) =
C(t — 1) + if E(t) < A
C(t — 1) — kE(t) otherwise
(4.6)
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This set of experiments consisted of the demonstrator performing a behaviour that was
composed of a single action and the imitator observing it having a set of behaviours in
its repertoire. The number of behaviours is not important since the behaviours run in
parallel and they are independent of each other5. Experiments with six behaviours are
shown for graph clarity reasons. It is important to note though that in the experiments
reported in this chapter, the demonstrator's behaviour was in the imitator's repertoire.








0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
Figure 4.6: Confidences of imitator's internal behaviours [A-F] when demonstrator
executes behaviour [A]; L-L condition
5 Only their confidences need to be compared, a simple computation performed at the end of the
demonstration.
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Figure 4.7: Confidences of imitator's internal behaviours [A-F] when demonstrator
executes behaviour [A]; L-H condition
Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, show the confidence values of each of the experimental condi¬
tions, L-L/H-H6, L-H, and H-L. In all three figures all the imitator's behaviours start
initially by having the same confidence, zero, and end up having a confidence correl¬
ated with their similarity to the demonstrated behaviour. Since the demonstrator is
demonstrating the movement towards reaching the letter [A]7, the imitator's [A] beha¬
viour gets the highest confidence, well above zero. All the other behaviours end up well
below zero. It is interesting to note that while clearly none of them have done well,
6 L-L and H-H conditions produce the same results; L-L is shown.
7 Prom now on, only the letter that corresponds to the posture that is to be achieved will be used to
represent movement from the rest position to that posture.
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some have done better than others. For example, [B] which is more similar to [A] than
the others (only differs from [A] by forty-five degrees on the right hand) has a higher
confidence (although still negative) than [E] and [F] for example, which differ from
[A] with respect to both hands. Since all the behaviours in the first iteration assume
the posture of the demonstrator, initially, and for several iterations, they all receive
positive reinforcement, because they all look plausible at the onset of the movement.
It is only after a few iterations (i.e. after the demonstrated movement has advanced)
that some of the behaviours look less plausible (i.e. their predictions are very different
from the actual demonstrated states), and their confidence levels begin to reflect that.
It is also interesting to note the difference between the L-H and the H-L conditions.
When the imitator is heavier, its resulting movements are slower. This results in beha¬
viours like [B] maintaining their confidence levels above zero for longer, because they
stay longer in the vicinity of the final state for [A] on their way to the final state for [B].
The opposite effect occurs in the H-L condition where the [B] behaviour starts descend¬
ing earlier than in L-H. The importance that the dynamical characteristics (including
the weight of the demonstrator/imitator) have in this process will be demonstrated
later in this chapter when the limitations of this implementation will be examined.
Sequences of actions
In this set of experiments, the demonstrator is executing behaviours that correspond
to 'words'. Behaviours start from the rest position, and move sequentially through the
postures that correspond to each of the letters of the word (without returning to the
rest position after each letter). Similarly to the single-movement experiments, all the
words of the imitator start from a confidence of zero, and end-up at a confidence level
dependent on their level of similarity with [Cooler], the demonstrated word. [Cool],
[Cook], [Coot] and [Cookie] are clearly rejected under all experimental conditions, while
[Cooler] always achieves the best confidence, with [Cooker] being the second best due
to its high similarity (only one letter different).
It is also interesting to observe the confidence graphs with respect to their behaviour
over time. All of the behaviours have [coo] as the first three letters, so all of them have
positive confidence while the demonstrator executes the [coo] part. Immediately after
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Figure 4.8: Confidences of imitator's internal behaviours [A-F] when demonstrator
executes behaviour [A]; H-L condition
that, [cookie], [cooker], [cook] and [coot] begin their descent while [cool] joins right
after the demonstration of the next letter [L] is also completed. It is also interesting
to note that [cooker] begins to regain some of its confidence , after the [K] has been
completed and [er] is being demonstrated.
Limitations
A final set of experiments demonstrates the limitations of this implementation: in
figure 4.12 the demonstrator is executing a behaviour that the imitator does have
in its repertoire ([cooler]); however this time the imitator is 400% heavier than the
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D: [Cooler]; I: [Cool], [Cook], [Cookie], [Cooker],[Coot], [Cooler]
Confidence x 1(P
Figure 4.9: Confidences of imitator's internal [Coo*] behaviours when demonstrator
executes behaviour [Cooler]; L-L/H-H condition
demonstrator, so it is not capable of executing the demonstrated behaviour at the
demonstrator's speed levels. As a result, all the behaviours end up with very low
(below zero) confidence values.
Figure 4.13 demonstrates the importance of limiting the adaptation of the gains within
upper and lower bounds. In this experiment, the previous experiment was repeated
but this time the gains were allowed to change without restrictions. As a result of
the different dynamics, the architecture tried to compensate for the prediction errors
by substantially increasing the gain parameters, but the plant was destabilized and
the resulting confidence levels were even worse than the ones achieved with limited
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D: [Cooler]; I: [Cool], [Cook], [Cookie], [Cooker],[Coot], [Cooler]
Confidence x 1(P
Figure 4.10: Confidences of imitator's internal [Coo*] behaviours when demonstrator
executes behaviour [Cooler]; L-H condition
adaptation.
4.5 Discussion
The active imitation architecture described in this chapter has certain advantages and
disadvantages. This section's aim is to discuss these.
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D: [Cooler]; I: [Cool], [Cook], [Cookie], [Cooker],[Coot], [Cooler]
Figure 4.11: Confidences of imitator's internal [Coo*] behaviours when demonstrator
executes behaviour [Cooler]; H-L condition
4.5.1 Advantages
The architecture described has three major advantages: agreement with biological data
available on imitation mechanisms, inherent parallelism, and principled treatment of
two imitation related problems, i.e. when to initiate learning algorithms, and how to
determine the quality of a match between demonstrated and internal actions. The
discussion on the agreement between the characteristics of this architecture and of
biological data is deferred until chapter 6; the two other advantages are described
below.
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D: [Cooler]; I: [Cool], [Cook], [Cookie], [Cooker],[Coot], [Cooler]
Confidence x 10^
Figure 4.12: Confidences of imitator's internal [Coo*] behaviours when demonstrator
executes behaviour [Cooler]; Imitator is 400% more heavy than demonstrator
The architecture described is fundamentally parallel in nature. Each behaviour obtains
a copy of the input data and handles on its own the generation of motor commands,
prediction, error signal and inhibition/reward values. This means that new behaviours
can be added easily in this framework without disturbing the current ones.
In addition, the architecture offers a principled way of dealing with two important
problems in imitation learning:
• How to determine the quality of match between demonstrated and internal be¬
haviours.
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D: [Cooler]; I: [Cool], [Cook], [Cookie], [Cooker],[Coot], [Cooler]
Confidence x 1(P
Figure 4.13: Confidences of imitator's internal [Coo*] behaviours when demonstrator
executes behaviour [Cooler]; Imitator is 400% more heavy than demonstrator, and
adaptation safety boundaries have been removed
• When to initiate learning of new behaviours.
Determining the quality of the match
One of the problems in imitation research is determining how well the imitated (in¬
ternally or externally) behaviour matches the demonstrated behaviour (Nehaniv and
Dautenhahn, 1998).
This can be demonstrated by taking a tennis serve as an example task: is the quality
of the match to be based on the trajectory of the arm, the trajectory of the tennis ball,
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or whether it achieved the task of sending the ball to the opposite court (and so on)?
Writing an evaluation formula given the criteria for comparison is not a major problem.
The problem lies in selecting these criteria according to the different situations, the
point here being that you can not judge all behaviours with the same set of criteria.
This architecture shifts the emphasis from adopting the ad-hoc criteria of a third
observer to using an internal set of criteria, the variables that the internally generated
behaviour is trying to control. This focuses the comparison to a subset of the perceived
information, and directs the imitator's attention to these.
Initiating learning
Another problem in imitation research is how to determine when to initiate any learning
algorithms that you might have. This usually relies on arbitrary or domain-dependent
criteria of what a novel or worthwhile behaviour is. For example, in Hayes and Demiris
(1994), where a learner robot is trying to learn by imitation how to negotiate the differ¬
ent types of corners in a maze, learning is initiated when a 'novel' event occurs, novel
in this case being a change in direction. This works well in the particular configuration
used, but it is an ad-hoc criterion externally imposed on the learner.
The architecture proposes using the confidence values as an initiator of learning. If
none of the behaviours that the imitator has in its repertoire managed to achieve
positive (or above a certain threshold) value, the demonstrated behaviour is novel and
the learning algorithms should be initiated in order to acquire this behaviour. The
next chapter is a demonstration of this.
4.5.2 Disadvantages
The architecture described earlier relies on having accurate forward models. If the
models are not accurate, even the right imitator's behaviours will be deemed inappro¬
priate since the generated predictions will be wrong. Although this disadvantage did
not produce any problems in the experiments reported in this chapter, in other situ¬
ations it might do, in which case it can be avoided by comparing the forward model's
prediction of a command's outcome with the actual outcome of executing that com¬
mand, and using the error signal to improve the forward model. It has been shown that
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forward models can improve simultaneously with the behaviours (or inverse models)
that they are connected to, while performing a task (Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992).
4.6 Summary/What next
In this chapter, a distributed architecture, based on paired behaviour-forward model
structures operating in parallel, was described, and experiments implementing it on a
dynamics simulator of a thirteen DoF robot were presented. It was demonstrated how
such an architecture can be used to generate an action as well as perceiving it when
generated by others.
The architecture described only considered the cases where the demonstrated action
or sequence of actions were already in the imitator's repertoire. If the demonstrated
action is not in the imitator's set of known actions, it will neither be recognised or
imitated. The next chapter deals with these cases, by blending the active imitation
architecture of this chapter, with the passive one of the previous chapter, with the final
dual-route architecture able to imitate and learn novel behaviours.
Chapter 5
Imitating and Learning Novel
Behaviours
5.1 Introduction
The architecture in the previous chapter can deal with the recognition and imitation of
demonstrated movements already in the imitator's repertoire. This chapter will deal
with the situations where the imitator does not know how to perform the demonstrated
movements, or only knows various parts of it but not the complete sequence. In
essence, this chapter combines the passive and active approaches described in the
previous chapters, in what will be a dual-route imitation architecture. First, the case of
completely unknown movement will be considered, followed by two cases of "sequence"
learning; one where all the parts are known and the learning of the sequence is required,
and one where some of the parts are known but not all of them.
5.2 Incorporating learning
In the experiments described in the previous chapter, the demonstrator does not per¬
form any movements that are not already in the imitator's repertoire. One of the
imitator's behaviours always ends up having positive confidence and is selected as the
one to be imitated. However, if the demonstrator performs a behaviour that the imit¬
ator does not know, all behaviours end up with negative or zero confidence and none
of them is judged as suitable for imitation. As was briefly mentioned in the discussion
section of the previous chapter, this can be used as a trigger condition in order to
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attempt to learn1 the demonstrated behaviour.
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The solution that is proposed in this chapter is to use the passive architecture of
chapter 3 in order to imitate any movements not already in the imitator's repertoire.








Figure 5.1: Combining the passive and the active imitation architectures
The representative postures that are extracted during the unknown demonstrated be¬
haviour are stored, and together with a PID controller, form new behaviours which are
added to the imitator's set. If the demonstrated behaviour consists of more than one
movement (if it is a 'word'), the situation is complicated by the fact that behaviours,
apart from being either completely known or unknown, can also contain known parts
(for example some letters might be known, while some others might not), in which case
what is required is the learning of the sequence, utilising the pre-existing representation
for the already known parts rather than learning them from scratch. All these cases
are examined in the experimental section that follows.
The fact that a behaviour that is already present in the imitator's repertoire might
appear (at any point during the demonstration) as part of the demonstrated sequence
requires the existence of a mechanism that reinitialises (resets) the imitator's behaviour
1 In this chapter, learning is the process of acquiring a behaviour, either its trajectory specifications
or the motor commands needed to achieve it. Learning as used here does not imply generalisation or
adaptation to different circumstances or any other processes as used in the field of machine learning
(Shavlik and Dietterich, 1990).
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during the demonstration2, so even if the behaviour has a low confidence because it
didn't match well previous parts of the demonstrated sequence, it will be given a new
chance for the current part.
The crucial issue here is, during the demonstration, when should a behaviour in the
imitator's repertoire be reset? The available options are:
• Reset upon completion of this behaviour.
• Reset when the confidence level of this behaviour has dropped below a certain
value.
• A combination of the previous two options
• Reset when all behaviours in the imitator's repertoire have been completed.
The experimental results in the next section will demonstrate that the best results were
obtained by the last option, i.e. resetting when all the behaviours in the imitator's
repertoire have been completed.
A related issue, which becomes particularly important in the last (and selected) option
is what happens to the confidence values of the behaviour if it is completed but is not
required to be reset until some point later? The options available are:
• The confidence drops immediately to zero when the behaviour is completed.
• The confidence value retains its final value until the behaviour is reset.
• The confidence adjustment formula is still applicable even after the completion
of the behaviour, which means that further confidence changes are dependent on
the difference between the behaviour's final state and the demonstrator's current
state.
For reasons that will be explained in the next section, the second option was selected.
2
Resetting involves re-running the initialisation steps that each behaviour takes at the start of the
experiment, i.e. the state of the behaviour is set to that of the demonstrator, its confidence is set
to zero, and the behaviour starts moving towards its first (or only) goal.
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In this section, the results of applying the hybrid active-passive architecture in three
possible cases are presented: the imitator observing a completely unknown movement
sequence, a sequence with all of its parts known to the imitator, and a sequence with
both known and novel parts. The methodology that has been adopted here in order to
describe the behaviour of the architecture is to demonstrate the unknown (or partially
known) movement to the imitator, record the confidence values of the imitator's beha¬
viours, and allow the imitator to attempt to acquire the demonstrated sequence. Then,
the experiment is repeated with the acquired behaviour being part of the imitator's
repertoire, and the confidence values of the imitator's behaviours are again recorded
during the demonstration. Graphs are displayed depicting the confidence values of the
behaviours in the imitator's repertoire before and after the acquisition.
5.3.1 Completely unknown movement
This set of experiments examines the cases which involve the demonstrator executing
a behaviour completely unknown to the imitator. Figure 5.2 shows the confidences
plot of the imitator's behaviours [A-F] while the demonstrator executes [G]. Natur¬
ally, all of imitator's behaviours end up with a negative confidence value; concurrently
with the internal execution of candidate behaviours, the passive route was extracting
the representative postures of the demonstrated movement. Since none of the beha¬
viours performed adequately during the demonstration, the extracted representative
postures, together with a PID controller, formed a new behaviour which was added to
the imitator's repertoire. The experiment is now repeated with the imitator equipped
with the [learned-G] behaviour. Figure 5.3 shows the confidences plot of the imitator's
internal behaviours while the demonstrator executes [G], where [learned-G] does end
up with positive confidence. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate the application of the
architecture in a sequence of two movements: the demonstrator executes [CA], and
the imitator is not capable of imitating it (figure 5.4) until the representative postures
have been extracted and the new behaviour has been added to the imitator's repertoire
(figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.2: The confidences plot before learning: demonstrator executes [G] while
imitator does not have that behaviour in its repertoire
5.3.2 All parts known
This set of experiments demonstrates the cases which involve the demonstrator execut¬
ing a behaviour which is not known to the imitator (as a sequence), but is composed
of known parts. Since a known behaviour can appear as part of the demonstration
at any point, there is a need for a mechanism for resetting behaviours, so they can
still detect occurrences of themselves in the demonstrated sequence, even if they don't
come right at the start of the demonstration. The interesting problem that is posed
here is when should a behaviour reset itself (and essentially "try again")? Four different
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Demonstrator: [G]; Imitator: [Learned G], [B], [C], [D], [E], [F]
Confidence
Figure 5.3: The confidences plot after learning: demonstrator executes [G] with imit¬
ator having the learned behaviour [L-G] in its repertoire
conditions were tested: resetting a behaviour when its confidence falls below a certain
level (example: figure 5.6), resetting each behaviour when it is completed (example:
figure 5.7), combining these two options (example: figure 5.8), and resetting each be¬
haviour when all the behaviours have been completed (example: figure 5.9). The final
option was selected since it provides more clear information for selecting behaviours
than the other three. The first option (figure 5.6) has the disadvantage that since
it is based on confidence levels, the first behaviour that does well will remain active
throughout the remainder of the demonstration. The second option (figure 5.7) has the
disadvantage that it does not provide a clear point where the confidence levels can be
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Demonstrator: [CA]; Imitator: [K], [L], [G], [M], [E], [F]
Confidence
Figure 5.4: The confidences plot before learning: demonstrator executes [CA] but
imitator does not know this behaviour
compared in order to select a winner behaviour. Combining the two does solve the first
problem, but worsens the second (figure 5.8). On the contrary, resetting behaviours
in a coordinated manner, when all of them are completed overcomes both problems
(figure 5.9): behaviours will achieve high confidence levels only during the presenta¬
tion of a relevant part of the demonstrated sequence, and comparison of confidence
levels can occur right before the coordinated resetting. Figure 5.9 illustrates this: the
demonstrator executes [Cut] while the imitator has [U, L, C, E, F, T] in its repertoire.
The first segment of the demonstration is successfully recognised as [C], and so are
the remaining [U] and [T] parts. The sequence is learned by simply concatenating the
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Demonstrator: [CA]; Imitator: [K], [L], [G], [M], [E], [Learned CA]
Confidence
Figure 5.5: The confidences plot after learning: demonstrator executes [CA] with
imitator having the learned behaviour [L-CA] in its repertoire
already known [C], [U], [T] behaviours.
Another question that needs to be answered is what happens to the confidence of a
behaviour after it is completed, but is not yet required to be reset? As mentioned earlier,
the confidence can either be set to zero, retain its final value, or remain dependent on
the difference between its (constant) state (the final state achieved) and the current
demonstrated state. The first one was rejected since it complicates the task of selecting
between behaviours by immediately resetting the confidence value of a behaviour to
zero when it is completed. A simple selection based on the final values is no longer
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Figure 5.6: Resetting each behaviour when its confidence falls below a certain level
possible, unless a record of the final values achieved by each behaviour is kept3. The
third one was rejected because it essentially amounts to punishing a behaviour for the
errors in predictions that occurred while waiting for other behaviours to be completed.
So, the second one was selected and used in the experiments reported here.
3 If a record of the final values is kept, and the comparison is based on these final values, options one
and two are functionally equivalent.
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Demonstrator: [Cut]; Imitator: [U], [L], [C], [E], [F], [T]
Confidence
Figure 5.7: Resetting each behaviour when it is completed
5.3.3 Some parts known
This section examines the cases where parts of the demonstration are known to the
imitator, but not all of them. The architecture deals with such cases by utilising the
existing representation of a behaviour when this behaviour achieves high, positive con¬
fidence levels, while utilising the extracted representative postures for the parts that
are not recognised. Example figure 5.10 illustrates this: the demonstrator executes
[Cut] with the imitator having behaviours [C, L , G, E, F, T], i.e. the [U] part is
unknown. As expected, after recognising the [C] part, the imitator fails to recognise
the [U] part, and subsequently is successful in recognising the [T] part. Representat-
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Demonstrator: [Cut]; Imitator: [U], [L], [C], [E], [F], [T]
Confidence
Figure 5.8: The previous two conditions combined: Resetting each behaviour when its
confidence falls below a certain level or when it is finished
ive postures extracted during the presentation of the [U] part are concatenated with
existing representations for the [C] and [T] parts, and the resulting behaviour achieves
high positive confidence when the experiment is re-run with the new behaviour in place
(figure 5.11).
5.4 Discussion
As demonstrated by the experiments in the previous section, the architecture resulting
from the combination of the passive and active routes described in chapters 3 and
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Figure 5.9: The confidence plots of behaviours [U, L, C, E, F, T] while demonstrator
executes [Cut] - resetting each behaviour when all behaviours are completed
4, has several desirable capabilities: it can learn behaviours from scratch (figures 5.3
and 5.5), concatenate existing behaviours to form sequences (figure 5.11), and is
capable of filling the gaps for sequences that are only partially known, using existing
representations for the known parts, and extracted ones for the unknown.
Comparing figures 4.6 with 5.3, and figures 4.9 with 5.5 reveals a clear difference
between the levels of confidence that predefined representations of a behaviour reach
and the ones reached by the learned representations. Pre-defined representations have
a much higher final confidence value than the learned ones for the same movement.
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Demonstrator: [Cut]; Imitator: [C], [L], [G], [E], [F], [T]
Confidence
Figure 5.10: The confidence plots of behaviours [C, L, G, E, F, T] while demonstrator
executes [Cut]
This is due to the fact that when the experiment is performed with the predefined
representations, the demonstrator and the imitator are attempting to achieve the same
set of goals (as defined precisely by the ISSC specifications). In the learned case, the
demonstrator still attempts to achieve the predefined goals, but the imitator is now
attempting to achieve the goals that were extracted through the passive route, which is
mediated through imprecise perception. The noisy representations extracted are good
enough to ensure recognition of the demonstrated movements that they correspond to,
but not to reach the same performance as the formal ones.
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Demonstrator: [Cut]; Imitator: [Learned Cut], [L], [G], [E], [F], [T]
Confidence x 1(P
Figure 5.11: The confidence plots of behaviours [L, C, E, F, T], and of learned behaviour
[L-Cut] while demonstrator executes [Cut]
One disadvantage of this architecture, in its current form, is that the coordinated reset¬
ting introduced in this chapter means that behaviours are no longer independent from
each other, and the number (and characteristics) of the behaviours in the imitator's
repertoire have an influence on the performance of the architecture. Each behaviour
(irrespective of the number of components it has) influences the performance of all
other behaviours by playing a role on the timing of their resetting. This might lead to
an undesirable situation where a longer but incorrect behaviour might delay the reset¬
ting of other behaviours so that they miss demonstration intervals where they might
be applicable. This could be solved by organising the behaviours in a more hierarchical
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manner, with more complex and long sequences at the top level and more basic and
short ones at the bottom. Then the architecture can be adapted such that behaviours
at one level of the hierarchy coordinate their resetting only with behaviours at the same
level while leaving (shorter) behaviours at a lower level free to reset more frequently.
This might introduce situations where there are more than one suitable behaviours at
a time. For example, if the demonstrator performs [CAT] and the imitator's repertoire
includes [CA], [C], and [A], then during the first part of the demonstration, both [CA]
and [C] followed by [A] will be having high confidence. This can be dealt with by
preferring longer (i.e. higher level) components over shorter ones when composing the
sequence to be acquired.
On a related note, some discussion is needed on the issue of "behaviour as a unit".
Behaviours in this architecture are treated as non-decomposable units, even when they
consist of a sequence of components. This has the disadvantage that if earlier parts
of a behaviour match the demonstration well, but subsequent parts do not, the whole
behaviour will be rejected as unsuitable. For example, if the demonstrator performs
[CAT] and the imitator has [CAR] and [T] in its repertoire, the demonstrated sequence
will not be recognised and it will be learned from scratch rather than taking the first
two letters of [CAR] and concatenating them with [T], Currently, there isn't any way
to utilise some parts of a behaviour only. Future work should address this issue by
incorporating the ability to decompose behaviours into their constituent parts. Even
the single letter behaviours, currently used as the basic set, can be decomposed into
more primitive movements, for example, splitting them into the right and left arm
components. This quest towards 'motor primitives' underlying all behaviours is an
important issue in motor control since it simplifies the complexity involved in the
control of articulated movement. Several proposals have been put forward including
programmable pattern generators based on non-linear attractor dynamics (Schaal and
Sternad, 1998), postural primitives (Williamson, 1996) inspired by those observed in
frogs and rats (Bizzi et al., 1991; Giszter et al., 1993), behaviour-based primitives
(Mataric et al., 1998a; Demiris and Mataric, 1998) and non-linear force fields (Mussa-
Ivaldi, 1997), among others.
Chapter 6
A model of primate imitation
mechanisms
In the previous chapters, two imitation architectures were presented, a passive and
an active one, and a hybrid combination of them was subsequently developed. In
this chapter, the biological plausibility of the combined dual-route architecture will be
examined by proposing it as a model of primate action imitation mechanisms. First, a
set of criteria that a model must meet in order to be useful will be presented, followed
by an analysis of the model based on these criteria.
6.1 On criteria for useful models
Despite extensive use in the Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and Artificial Life
fields of the word "model", there are surprisingly few attempts to develop a set of
criteria with respect to what a proper and useful model should be like (notable excep¬
tions, frequently from scientists in other fields, include (Lehman, 1977; Rothenberg,
1989; Webb, 1993). By considering programs as the computational embodiments of a
theory of how the modelled system might work, a substantial amount of theoretical
work from the philosophy of science literature (e.g. Popper, 1972) on the possible cri¬
teria concerning the adequacy and proper form of a theory can be useful here. Having
as a primary target the development of useful models, the following criteria were set
for use in this thesis:
• A model should be clear on what it is a model of, and at what level of description.
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This allows the incorporation of a number of pieces of evidence regarding the
structure and behaviour of the modelled system as test sets for the plausibility
of the model. A model should be accurate with respect to this evidence. The
degree of accuracy, and the range of evidence that it agrees with can be used as
a measure of the generality of the model.
• By virtue of being designed as an analog of the modelled system, a model should
provide possible explanations for the data available about the modelled system.
• A model should be able to generate testable predictions. This is considered im¬
portant in order to establish the scientific usefulness of the model, and demarcate
it from useless exercises in computer programming.
The rest of the chapter is organised around these criteria. The following three sections
present the validation data, the explanations and the predictions respectively.
6.2 The architecture as a model of primate imitation mech¬
anisms
The first criterion of the ones described earlier requires an explicit statement on what
the architecture is a model of. The aim of this section is to propose the architecture
described in chapter 5 as a model of primate imitation mechanisms, and describe
evidence from imitation research in primates that can be used as test sets for the
plausibility of the model.
6.2.1 Why primate?
Why specifically target primates? The main reason for this is that, in contrast to
"lower" animals where the majority of research has concentrated on whether a cer¬
tain animal is capable of imitation or not (chapter 2), there is a sufficient amount
of data with respect to the underlying mechanisms of primate imitation to make a
computational model possible.
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6.2.2 The validation data
This section presents neurophysiological, psychological and brain activation data per¬
taining to issues important to the approach adopted in this thesis. Firstly, human
brain activation data are presented, followed by neurophysiological data on "mirror
neurons" found in the premotor areas of the monkey brain. Since this thesis advoc¬
ates imitation as a repetition of an earlier (internally performed) generative process,
psychological data on working memory for movements are presented. The interplay
between observing, imagining, performing and imitating a movement is the unifying
theme of the psychophysical data presented right after, and the presentation of the val¬
idation data is concluded with the examination of data available on human imitation
capabilities following brain damage, focusing on resulting apraxia disorders.
Activation of brain structures in humans
In humans, several experiments have investigated the interplay between action genera¬
tion and action perception (Demiris and Hayes, 1999). Fadiga et al. (1995) stimulated
the motor cortex of human observers and recorded the motor evoked potentials (MEPs)
from hand muscles, utilising the assumption that if action observation activates the
premotor cortex (as it does in monkeys), this activation should induce an increase of
the motor evoked potentials elicited by the magnetic stimulation of the motor cortex.
They found a significant increase of the MEPs when subjects observed movements,
and additionally the patterns of muscle activation was very similar to the pattern of
muscle contraction present during the execution of the same action, i.e. the increase
was present only in those muscles that are active when the human subjects executed
these actions.
A different set of experiments with human subjects used Positron Emission Tomo¬
graphy (PET) brain scanning as a way of mapping the brain regions whose activations
are associated with the observation of hand actions (Decety et al., 1997), as well as
mental rehearsal (Decety et al., 1994) (similar to what was termed "internal genera¬
tion" in the architecture of chapter 4).
In Decety et al. (1994) normal subjects were asked to either passively observe move-
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ments of a virtual hand grasping objects or to imagine their own hand grasping objects,
presented through a virtual reality system. Their brain activity during these condi¬
tions was mapped1. The results demonstrated that cortical and sub-cortical motor
structures were activated both during movement observation and movement imagery.
It was concluded that consciously representing an action involved a pattern of cortical
and subcortical activation that resembles the one observed during an intentionally ex¬
ecuted action. It is important to note that during the observation condition, subjects
were instructed to watch the movements of the virtual hand "as if it were their own
hand"2. The importance of the observer's intentions during observation was further
examined in Decety et al. (1997) where subjects observed actions with the aim of
either recognising them or imitating them later. The results showed that the pattern
of activation was different between the two conditions, suggesting that the motivations
and intent of the observer during the demonstration determine (or at least influence)
which brain structures will be activated to process the incoming stimuli. Decety et al.
(1997) also examined the effect that the meaning of the observed actions has on the
patterns of brain activation during observation. The results were striking: different
brain structures were activated when the actions demonstrated were meaningless to
the observer than those activated when the actions were known to the observer3. This
is very interesting since it indicates that knowing or not the action demonstrated has
an influence on the way this action will be processed in order to be imitated.
Mirror neurons in monkeys.
Neurophysiological experiments with macaque monkeys have revealed an important
class of neurons in area F5 of the monkey's premotor cortex, which were termed "mirror
neurons" (Gallese et al., 1996; di Pellegrino et al., 1992). These neurons were found
to become active both when the monkey executes goal-oriented movements, and when
1 There was also a third condition where subjects had to visually inspect presented objects without
being required to carry out any action. The activity present during this condition (i.e. due to visual
analysis and object recognition processes) was used as a baseline which was subtracted from the
activity present in the other two conditions.
2 This is similar to the first step taken by the behaviours in the active imitation route, i.e. internally
assuming the observed state of the demonstrator.
3 The meaningless actions were derived from the American Sign Language that the subjects were not
familiar with, and the meaningful actions were pantomimes such as drawing a line, hammering a
nail etc.
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it observes the demonstration of similar movements executed by another monkey or a
human demonstrator. A variety of mirror neurons were discovered: grasping, tearing,
manipulating, and placing objects neurons, among others. Some of the neurons were
active only during the demonstration while some others remained active for a while
after the end of the demonstrated action. The majority of the mirror neurons are active
selectively when the monkey is observing a particular type of action (e.g. grasping),
and some of them are highly selective not only to the type of action, but also to the
particular way that the action is executed (e.g. grasping with the index finger and
the thumb). The distance of the demonstrator from the monkey does not affect the
responses of the mirror neurons, and control experiments have ruled out the possibility
that the neurons are active simply as a response to particular visual configurations (for
example, either of the demonstrator's hand or of the monkey's own hand) since most of
them are also active when the monkey executes the action in darkness. Non-biological
stimuli (for example, observing a set of pliers grasping the object) do not activate the
neurons.
Memory and imitation
In the approach advocated in this thesis, imitation of a movement is essentially a repe¬
tition of an earlier generative process. Substantial work in the area of working memory
for movements has been conducted by Smyth and her colleagues (Smyth et al., 1988;
Smyth and Pendleton, 1989). A range of experiments studied the memory span for
demonstrated movements when the subject was allowed to freely observe the move¬
ments or asked to concurrently carry out a "suppression task"4. In the first set of
studies (Smyth et al., 1988), subjects were asked to observe a series of movements
either directed to spatial targets5, or designed to achieve particular pattern of limb
states (body configurations), while carrying out a "suppression task", consisting of
either movements to spatial targets or body-configuration related movement. Memory
span was reduced when the subject observed spatial-target oriented movements and
4 A "secondary" task designed to test the interference between its underlying processes and the
primary task that the subject is performing.
5 In a standard "Cori blocks" task (de Renzi and Nichelli, 1975) where a set of wooden blocks is
placed in front of the subject and the experimenter taps them in a particular sequence which the
subject is later asked to repeat.
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the suppression task was also spatial-target oriented, but was not reduced when the
suppression task was body-configuration related. The reverse dissociation was also ob¬
served. Similar results were reported in subsequent experiments (Smyth and Pendleton,
1989) involving spatial target or pattern-oriented hand movements, and the same dis¬
sociations were reported in the case of well practised everyday motor tasks involving
a complex interaction of the two types of movement using rowing as an example task
(Woodin and Heil, 1996).
Finally, the interplay between memory and movement imitation was also studied in
several other experiments. Zimmer and Engelkamp (1996) reported that the perform¬
ance of subjects on free recall of a set of movements was not different in two of the
experimental conditions which involved either perceiving the movement or perceiving
the movements and subsequently (after the presentation of each of them) imitating
them6. Related results were reported by Abravanel (1991) who experimented with
the effects on memory of immediate vs. deferred imitation of demonstrated actions in
infants, and did not find any difference between the two conditions, especially in older
infants (17-20 months old). The subjects were able to encode and retain as much from
perceiving the modelled acts as from imitating them. This effect was not so clear in
younger infants (13-16 months old) who performed slightly better when they imitated
the actions.
Observation, imagery, actual performance and imitation
Of relevance to the work presented in this thesis are also psychophysical experiments
investigating the differences between observing an action, imagining an action and
executing that action. Vogt (1995) performed a series of studies where subjects learned
to reproduce a sequence of cyclical arm movements, either through repeatedly observing
the sequence on a monitor, or through mentally or physically rehearsing the sequence.
The results were very interesting since they demonstrated that observation or mental
or physical rehearsal led to similar improvement in temporal consistency when the
subject was later asked to reproduce the observations. Some further experiments (Vogt,
1996) with a short-term memory paradigm where subjects were allowed to observe
6 Other experimental conditions included verbal recall and combinations of the above.
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the model movement7 only once, showed that timing imitation did not benefit from
any further intermediate imitation (imaginary or physical) in the interval between the
presentation of the model movement and the point were the subjects were asked to
reproduce it. Related results were obtained in "mental chronometry" experiments by
Decety (1996). Subjects were asked to perform a task8 either mentally or physically.
The movement times required to execute the task were very similar irrespective of the
modality of execution (mental or physical). In related sets of experiments (Decety
et ah, 1991; Wang and Morgan, 1992; Wuyam et ah, 1995), subjects were asked to
mentally perform tasks that would require different physical effort9 and found that
autonomic responses (cardiac and respiratory activity) during motor imagery paralleled
the autonomic responses to physically performing the task.
Brain &: cognitive disorders and imitation abilities
"In any well-made machine, one is ignorant of the working of most of the parts -
the better they work, the less we are conscious of them... it is only a fault which
draws our attention to the existence of a mechanism at all" . Kenneth Craik,
The nature of explanation.
Since imitation is a complex task involving the integration of information from multiple
brain systems including perception, memory and motor systems, it has been used as
a reference task for identifying and assessing various brain and cognitive disorders. In
particular (and most relevant to this thesis) it has been used to identify and assess
the various forms of apraxia, a "neurological disorder of learned purposive movement
skills that is not explained by deficits of elemental motor or sensory systems" (Rothi
and Heilman, 1997). Apraxia usually results from brain damage (usually in the left
hemisphere) and its symptoms vary, giving rise to the various forms of apraxia, which
are identified through a series of tests, that involve performance of actions on verbal
command, imitation of meaningful and meaningless gestures, and gesture recognition
and naming. A type of apraxia of particular relevance here is visuo-imitative apraxia
7 The model movements were different patterns of relative timing.
8 Tasks included drawing a cube, writing a sentence with either hand, and walking to targets at
various distances.
9 Tasks included walking, running, walking on a treadmill, and lifting dumbbells
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(Mehler, 1987). Patients suffering from this apraxia are able to perform meaningful
gestures when they are described verbally, or when they are asked to imitate them
after a demonstration, but are unable to imitate meaningless gestures (Goldenberg
and Hagmann, 1997; Merians et al., 1997). The nature of the demonstrated act, and in
particular whether the act is known or not to the imitator, appears to be very important
and determines whether or not the patient will be able to imitate it. This correlates
well with the brain activation data described earlier, which show that different brain
areas are activated depending on the nature of the demonstrated act, and its meaning
to the observer (Decety et al., 1997).
Two additional disorders are also of interest here: autism and imitation behaviour.
Autism is a syndrome which includes abnormalities of social and communicative de¬
velopment, partially characterised by an inability to comprehend the viewpoints of
other people (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993). People suffering from autism display severe
deficits in imitation and pantomime tasks (Smith and Bryson, 1994), which cannot be
attributed to visual recognition memory, motor initiation and basic motor coordina¬
tion deficits (Rogers et al., 1996). Furthermore, autistic children show deficiencies in
empathy and joint attention tasks, as well as an inability to engage in pretend play
(Charman et al., 1997). On the other side of the spectrum are patients that suffer from
frontal-lobe damage, and display a pathological behaviour that has been termed "im¬
itation behaviour" (Lhermitte et al., 1986). These patients imitate the demonstrator's
gesture although they were not instructed to do so, and some times even when told
not to do so (de Renzi et al., 1996). An explicit, direct command from the doctor to
the patient would stop the imitation behaviour but a simple distraction to a different
subject was sufficient to see imitation reappearing, despite the patient remembering
what (s)he had been told.
6.3 Explanations
Involvement of motor systems during perception
The human brain and mirror neuron activation data suggest that there is a motor sys¬
tem involvement during observation of movement. The explanation offered for these
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data is that the motor system is activated in order to generate and internally simulate
candidate behaviours, and offer predictions regarding the incoming perceptual data
from the demonstrator. On a more specific note, the fact that some mirror neurons
cease to be active when the demonstration is complete while others continue to be
active for a while after the end of the demonstration can be explained if viewed within
the composite nature of the organisation of the behaviours: more complex ones can
be composed from elementary ones. Upon completion, a behaviour X ceases to be
active; however, a behaviour X* which incorporates X as its initial step will continue
to be active, since it is still capable of offering further predictions about the demon¬
strator's future states until X* completes its remaining steps. This suggests that the
mirror neurons that cease to be active when the demonstrated action finishes represent
that action specifically, while the other class of neurons which remain active represent
sequences of actions that incorporate the demonstration as their first part.
The active route of the architecture understands an action by internally generating it.
The observer does imitate the demonstrated movement internally, even when it does not
do so externally. This feature of the architecture explains why physically imitating a set
of demonstrated movements does not aid their later recall (Zimmer and Engelkamp,
1996), as well as why physical rehearsal of a demonstrated behaviour does not lead
to any significant differences in the levels of performance improvement from mental
rehearsal or mere observation (Vogt, 1995). Since observation, imagery and imitation
are done using mostly the same structures (behavioural modules and forward models)
the same laws should govern their operation, which explains the mental chronometry
data by Decety (1996), which indicate that it takes roughly the same time to perform
a task mentally or physically.
Influence of content of the demonstrated action
The human brain activation data described by Decety et al. (1997) indicate that dif¬
ferent brain structures are activated during the observation of an action depending on
whether the action is known to the observer or not. This is explained by the dual-route
nature of the architecture: if the demonstrated act is known to the imitator, then the
corresponding behaviour in the active imitation route will be activated. If the demon-
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strated act is not known to the imitator, then the passive route will be activated in
order to extract the representative postures and acquire the demonstrated behaviour.
Currently, there are no brain activation data to correlate with the behaviour of the
architecture for the cases where the demonstration consisted of sequences of actions,
and particularly partially-known sequences.
If the passive route is destroyed, the architecture will no longer be able to imitate any
novel behaviours, although, with the active route intact, behaviours that are already
known will be successfully imitated. This correlates favourably with the neuropatho-
logical data for patients suffering with visuo-imitative apraxia (Mehler, 1987).
6.4 Predictions
In chapter 4, the computational studies revealed limits to what the architecture can
perceive, in particular with respect to movement speeds. If the demonstration is per¬
formed at speeds that cannot be attained by the imitator, the demonstrated actions
will not be understood, even if they are in the imitator's repertoire. By projecting
this behaviour to that of the mirror neurons described earlier, the architecture offers
a testable prediction: a mirror neuron which is active during the demonstration of an
action should not be active (or possibly be less active) if the demonstration is done
at speeds unattainable by the monkey. A further prediction with respect to mirror
neurons has already been hinted at earlier in the explanation section. Mirror neurons
that remain active for a period of time after the end of the demonstration are encoding
more complex sequences that incorporate the demonstration as their first part. Fur¬
ther investigation through manipulation of the demonstration (adding further actions
to it, while retaining the first part) should reveal the exact sequence that the neuron is
encoding. Two less easily testable prediction regarding the mirror neurons are: (a) the
existence of other goal directed mirror neurons and (b) the trainability of new mirror
neurons. The first one predicts that there exist mirror neurons for other goal-directed
actions: since perception and generation of an action is so tightly coupled, it can be
expected that at least the most important actions in the monkey's repertoire (body
postures that convey messages, for example threat postures, facial expressions, among
others) should have mirror neurons associated with them. The second one predicts
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that, since the passive route provides the active route with new behaviours after their
demonstration, it should be possible to create new mirror neurons by training the
monkey to imitate a demonstrated action.
6.5 Discussion
The architecture, if viewed as a model, suggests that when humans and other primates
observe a movement with the intent to imitate, they "put themselves in the place of
the demonstrator", and do what they would do if they were in the demonstrator's
place. Understanding a demonstrated movement comes from internally generating
alternatives and selecting among those, based on the quality of their predictions. But
why predict? Why not wait until the demonstration has finished and classify the
result? From an evolutionary perspective, the ability to predict and its adoption during
observation might have prevailed since it allows the animal to act/respond to an action
of a conspecific before that (potentially non-beneficial to the observer) action has been
completed.
The initial step taken by the observer, of putting herself in the position of the demon¬
strator, seems to be important too. Autistic children who suffer from an inability to
do so, as witnessed by their poor performance in empathy, joint attention and pretend
play tests, are unable to imitate. Normal children observing a human experimenter
demonstrating an act but failing at it10, do imitate the intended action of the human
successfully, but do not do so when they see a mechanical device trying to do the same
act but failing (Meltzoff, 1995). An explanation for this could be that the children did
manage to imagine themselves in the place of the demonstrator when the demonstrator
was human but not when it was not of biological nature. As already mentioned earlier,
mirror neurons also do not respond when the action (e.g. grasping) is done with pliers,
and not by a human arm (Gallese et al., 1996).
The dual route nature of the architecture is interesting too. It was already discussed
in the explanations section earlier, that damaging the passive route leads to behaviour
similar to that of visuo-imitative apraxic patients. What about the reverse condition?
10 For example, trying to pull apart a dumbbell, but failing due to finger slippage
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There is currently no evidence for the reverse dissociation, i.e. having the active route
destroyed while retaining the passive one intact. This condition would be hard to
detect, since known behaviours can still be imitated through the passive route as be¬
ing novel. However, it is important to note that, essentially, the active route maps
the observed movements to the imitator's internal ones, i.e. it serves as a recogni¬
tion process. Any internal representations associated with these behaviours (including
symbolic ones, for example the name of the behaviour, or emotional significance, in¬
tentions or any other attributes) can be retrieved through this route11. There are cases
reported related to a disruption to this process: Gonzalez-Rothi et al. (1986) reported
two patients who could imitate demonstrated pantomimes but could not recognise (or
discriminate among) them in what is termed as "pantomime agnosia".
In the experiments reported in this thesis, all behaviours that are present in the im¬
itator's repertoire are activated in order to generate alternatives and offer predictions
as to what comes next. For efficiency reasons, it is conceivable that context can be
used in order to select among all the available actions the ones that are applicable
or at least relevant to the current situation. Although it is still early to speculate
about the exact nature of this process, experiments with humans and monkeys have
shown that actions applicable to a certain context are retrieved even if no action is
required on behalf of the subject. (Rizzolatti et ah, 1988; Murata et al., 1997) have
shown that there are neurons in the area F5 (same area with the mirror neurons) of the
monkey's premotor cortex which are active during grasping movements, but are also
active when the monkey views a graspable object. The interpretation favoured by the
experimenters was that the responses of the F5 neurons represented the description of
the presented object in motor terms, i.e. the visual features of the object are auto¬
matically translated into a potential motor action (regardless of whether the monkey
intended to move or not). In humans, experiments with positron emission tomography
have shown that observation of tools activated the premotor areas in the absence of
any overt motor demand12. These data indicate that the brain might indeed be using
context to reduce the amount of behaviours that will be tried out.
11 It has been suggested (Gallese and Goldman, 1998) that the role of the mirror neurons is to facilitate
the detection of the mental states of observed conspecifics by adopting their perspective.
12 It is interesting to note that the additional task of silent tool naming did not result in any additional
activation of the premotor cortex, but tool-use naming did.
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Currently, a single presentation is enough for the architecture to acquire a new beha¬
viour. It is not clear how this relates to primate behaviour but the architecture could
be modified so that only frequently-occurring behaviours get acquired, or possibly the
most biologically-important to the imitator. Then the passive route would essentially
act as a short-term memory which would filter the behaviours letting only some of
them through to the long-term memory of the active route.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Overview of the thesis
This thesis set out to investigate movement imitation architectures, which apart from
being detailed enough to be implementable on robotic systems, attempted to keep close
to data that are available on monkey and human imitation. First, a computational ar¬
chitecture inspired by Meltzoff's Active Intermodal Matching hypothesis was designed
and implemented. Its low signal requirements and its reliance on representations known
to be available in the human and monkey brain makes it an attractive candidate for
a model of early infant imitation mechanisms. However, it was pointed out that there
are at least two lines of evidence against it being a general model of imitation. Its
indifferent treatment of novel and known movements and the involvement of the motor
system only during the execution phase were not in agreement with biological data
on human brain activation patterns which advocate different treatment of novel and
known demonstrated movements, and strong involvement of the motor systems during
perception of movements.
To address these issues, a novel architecture was designed which tackled the prob¬
lem from a different perspective: the imitator actively generates behaviours while the
demonstration is unfolding, and selects among them based on the accuracy of the
predictions they offer regarding the incoming states of the demonstrator. The motor
system is actively involved during perception: the action generation systems are being
used to also perform the action perception. This offers an explanation as to why the
human and monkey motor systems are active both during a demonstration, and as to
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why monkey mirror neurons are active both during the perception and the production
of the action they encode. This also leads to testable predictions: mirror neurons
encoding certain actions will be less or not active at all during the demonstration
of the actions they encode, if these actions are performed at speeds unattainable by
the monkey. Embodiment has been advocated to play an important role in cognition
(Dautenhahn, 1997; Mataric, 1997), and this work is a demonstration that this extends
to the perception side of cognition too. Perception of actions in the active route is not
an abstract process, classifying events as instances of generic classes, but utilises the
specific generative models that the agent has, which have been developed as a result
of having to control this specific body.
However, this active architecture is unable to imitate demonstrated behaviours that it
does not have in its repertoire. The final contribution of this thesis was the merging
of the passive and active architectures into a dual-route model. When none of the
behaviours in the imitator's repertoire accurately predicts the incoming states of the
demonstrator, control is passed to the passive route which extracts the representative
postures and executes them in sequence, as well as forming new behaviours with them.
These new behaviours are added to the active route, and are shown to achieve good
levels of confidence during the demonstration of the action they encode. Viewing
imitation as a two route process correlates well with human brain activation data
which indicate that different brain structures are activated during the demonstration
of known and novel movements. Destroying the passive route while retaining the active
one intact leads to symptoms similar to those displayed by visuo-imitative apraxia
patients: while the imitator is capable of imitating known movements, (s)he cannot
imitate any novel ones.
The work reported here advocates that imitation can be used to probe internal states
of other agents in a social environment. Mentally putting oneself in someone's else
position and generating ("imagining") potential alternatives facilitates the retrieval of
any intentions, emotions or other internal attributes that are associated with them.
Autistic children and adults are not good impersonators as evidenced from their per¬
formance in pretend play and joint empathy, and (possibly as a consequence) do not




There are several directions that future research continuing the work reported here
can take. These include further examining the units of representation that were used
by the architecture, applying the architecture to the imitation of object-related be¬
haviours, equipping the architecture with the ability to decompose behaviours, and
enabling stronger competition between the behaviours during observation. These will
be discussed in the following subsections.
7.2.1 Units of representation
Both routes of the developed architecture use postures as the unit of representation: in
the passive route, the demonstrator's movements are perceived and stored as sequences
of postures; in the active route the confidence values of the behaviours are calculated
based on the prediction error which is derived as a difference between two postural
states. There are good reasons for using posture: it is always computable and it has
high biological significance. However, although there is evidence that the brain has
representations of the static posture available both for the visual and proproceptive
modalities (and has developed associated specialised feature detectors) it is not ne¬
cessary the case that they are utilised in a way similar to the one in the developed
architecture. Other possibilities include more dynamic representations based on move¬
ments, for example qualitative descriptions of movement primitives of the form "move
body part X in direction A", although it is not immediately clear what parametrisa-
tions would be the appropriate ones, and whether there is more biological evidence in
favour of such representations than there is for postures. Of course, there isn't any
theoretical reason why more that one representation shouldn't be and isn't being used.
7.2.2 Object-related behaviour
An interesting new direction for further research would be the application of such ar¬
chitecture on a different set of scenarios involving object-related behaviours. Imitation
of picking, placing and assembling tasks would ask for additional criteria for judging
the prediction accuracy of the internal behaviours. For example, comparison tests
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might be focused on the distance of the demonstrator's arm from the object rather
than body configurations. Predictions can also be formed at a more abstract level as
well, for example, in an assembly task predictions can be made with respect to what
the next state of the assembled structure will be. This would also permit a more direct
comparison between this work and the robot assembly by observation work.
7.2.3 Behaviour decomposition
As it was mentioned in chapter 5, behaviours are currently treated as non-decomposable
units. This means that even if parts of a behaviour match the demonstration well,
the whole behaviour will be rejected as invalid. Future research should investigate
methods on decomposing behaviours, and re-using parts of them if those are doing
well in a subset of the demonstration. This will potentially require maintaining several
independent indicators of prediction accuracy, although it is not obvious which aspects
of a behaviour should have associated indicators and which ones should not.
7.2.4 Competition between behaviours
In the architecture developed the behaviours compete between each other only indir¬
ectly at the final selection stage: the one with the highest confidence value is selected.
It is conceivable that competition can be initiated earlier in the process with beha¬
viours that currently are doing well sending inhibition signals to the other behaviours.
This might result in the correct behaviour being distinguished from the others much
earlier in the process, but it might also result in the right behaviours being inhibited
by less suitable ones because the latter perform better initially.
7.3 Epilogue
The work reported here has made an explicit attempt to bring together data from
several disciplines including psychology, neurophysiology, pathology, and robotics, and
construct a computational model which is general enough to encompass all these data,
while being detailed enough to allow implementation on robotic platforms. Using
computational and robotic models to study the properties of real neural systems is
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a difficult task since, apart from terminological issues, the disciplines involved oper¬
ate with different levels of descriptions. The model developed offers explanations for
the biological data described, but perhaps more importantly offers predictions which
can be tested back in the neurophysiological laboratory, resulting in more data which
can in turn be fed back into the model. This interaction between experimentalists
and modellers can drive both experimental and theoretical work forward, and makes
interdisciplinary research so promising.
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